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Organization of the United  
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## Office of Evaluation

### Final Evaluation

### **SUDAN INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY PROGRAMME: FOOD SECURITY INFORMATION FOR ACTION (SIFSIA) SOUTH SUDAN**

#### Final report

February 2012

## Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

Office of Evaluation (OED)

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## Acronyms

AGN	Nutrition & Consumer Protection Division (FAO)
ANLA	Annual Needs & Livelihoods Assessment (WFP)
CFSAM	Crop & Food Security Assessment Mission (FAO/WFP)
CLiMIS	Crop and Livestock Market Information System
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CTA	Chief Technical Adviser
EC	European Commission (of the EU)
ESA	Agricultural Development Economics Division (FAO)
ESS	Statistics Division (FAO)
EU	European Union
EWS	Early Warning System
FAPF	Food & Agriculture Policy Framework
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation (UN)
FARM	Food, Agribusiness and Rural Markets (USAID)
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FMO	Framework of Mutual Obligations
FS	Food Security
FSTS	Food Security Technical Secretariat
GIS	Geographic Information System
GPS	Geographic Positioning System
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoS	Government of Sudan
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IITA	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
ISFNS	Information System for Food & Nutrition Security
LAF	Livelihoods Analysis Forum
LAU	Livelihoods Assessment Unit (NBS)
LoA	Letter of Agreement
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MoAF	Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
MoARF	Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries
MoFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MoGCSW	Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare
MoH	Ministry of Health
MHA	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs
MTE	Mid-term Evaluation
MTR	Ministry of Transport and Roads
MWRI	Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation
NBHS	National Baseline Household Survey
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NDVI	Normalised Difference Vegetation Index
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NRL	Land and Water Division (FAO)
NRM	Natural Resource Management
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee
PSU	Project Support Unit

PTF	Project Task Force
RCA	Rapid Crop Assessment
SAFDP	Support to Agriculture and Forestry Development Project
SC	Steering Committee
SCUK	Save the Children UK
SIFSIA	Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action
SMA	Sudan Meteorological Authority
SPCRP	Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSCCSE	South(ern) Sudan Commission for the Census, Statistics and Evaluation (now the National Bureau of Statistics)
SSDP	South Sudan Development Plan
SSRRC	South(ern) Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
TC	Technical Committee
TCE	Emergency Operations & Rehabilitation Division (FAO)
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNJLC	United Nations Joint Logistics Centre
UNOCHA	UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (WFP)
WFP	World Food Programme

## Executive Summary

The **Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action (SIFSIA)** is one of the first of its kind in attempting to build government capacity in terms of food security information and analysis *and* strengthening food security policy-making, in a “post-conflict” and challenging environment. This final evaluation of SIFSIA-South (SIFSIA-S) aims to capture the learning from the SIFSIA experience to inform future projects of this kind in Sudan and elsewhere, as well as to review the overall performance of the programme. It focuses on the second phase of the programme following the mid-term evaluation, from January/February 2009 to October/November 2011.

The defining event, politically and economically since 2009, has been the **secession of South Sudan** in July 2011. However, with independence, South Sudan faces many challenges, not least the destruction of physical and market infrastructure during the prolonged civil war, which has severely limited agriculture sector recovery. Agriculture is predominantly subsistence farming (despite the considerable potential of the sector) and contributes little to the economic growth of South Sudan whose national budget relies heavily on its oil revenue. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, more than 3 million South Sudanese (representing over 35% of its population) have returned from the north and other neighbouring countries adding additional pressure to the high levels of rural and urban poverty. The rapidly evolving political context since the CPA (including the establishment of government institutions in the south, ensuring security in areas of inter-ethnic conflict, conducting the census and the referendum, and managing the process of secession) has taken much of the government attention. This has been a very challenging environment within which to implement SIFSIA-S and to have a new sovereign national authority comply with the conditions of the project.

The **GoSS** demonstrated its clear **commitment to SIFSIA-S** at the outset of the programme by convening a Steering Committee (later supplemented by a Technical Committee) and by establishing a high level Food Security Council (FSC) by Presidential Decree in 2008, supported by a Food Security Technical Secretariat (FSTS) within the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The functioning of the FSC, and in particular its “oversight” as a multi-sectoral body to the FSTS, has however been limited without the appointment of a Secretary General. This has reduced the effectiveness of the FSTS to influence strategies and policy, although measures to provide humanitarian assistance and to remove tax on food commodities were undertaken by GoSS based on the analysis of the FSTS.

Prior to SIFSIA, there was no government-led **food security information** in South Sudan. Now the FSTS (comprising a small, but committed technical team) generates a number of bulletins, updates and briefs on food and nutrition security, agro-meteorology, markets and policy issues. The information and analysis remains limited, but it provides a good foundation from which to build. Drawing upon FAO technical support, the programme has undertaken a review of different policies relating to food security in South Sudan and has contributed to both the Food & Agriculture Policy Framework (FAPF) 2011-2015 and the South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013. However, insufficient attention has so far been accorded to nutrition nor gender and no contribution towards policy development in the livestock and fisheries sector.

SIFSIA has placed much emphasis on strengthening the government capacity to conduct **food security and livelihood analysis** in South Sudan. Much was achieved throughout the programme by simply raising awareness across government staff of the food security concept. An early initiative of the programme (notably both north and south) was to support the National Baseline Household Survey (NBHS), which led to the national Security Assessment in Sudan early in 2011. It has also supported the development of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), which is coordinated by the Livelihoods Analysis Forum (LAF) of the NBS, and has contributed significantly to mapping levels of food and nutrition insecurity across the livelihood zones of South Sudan on a quarterly basis. There are concerns about the quality and consistency of data feeding into the IPC, but it does encourage a regular collaborative exercise across agencies and line ministries at state level, and raises an important level of awareness on the principal issues affecting food and nutrition insecurity.

Probably the most visible output of SIFSIA-S is CLiMIS, the online **crop and livestock marketing information** system. Drawing upon market data at state level, it is first network of market monitoring and analysis in South Sudan run and maintained by government. There are still gaps in the frequency and coverage of the commodities’ data, but the information and analysis is freely accessible on the website and contributes directly to the FSTS bulletins and reports. SIFSIA-S has also supported the implementation of Crop & Food Security Assessment Missions (CFSAM) and Rapid Crop Assessments (RCA) in response to poor rainfall performance in

certain areas, however, the capacity of line ministries at state level to conduct such **surveys** or undertake regular **monitoring** remains very weak through lack of resources. Furthermore, there has been considerably less focus on surveillance of livestock, animal health and fisheries (outside the market information) although these are key determinants of household food security in South Sudan.

The installation of Automated Weather Stations (AWS) across the country and the technical capacity built within the Southern Sudan Meteorological Agency (SMA) are ensuring better monitoring of seasonal trends and (in association with NDVI data) providing early warning on **rainfall performance**. Furthermore, the **natural resource mapping** exercise which has resulted in the land cover database and atlas, will be an important reference to future agricultural monitoring, planning and programming at both national and state levels. However, earlier delays and concerns about cost, did affect the ability of the dataset to achieve its potential within the timescale of the programme. Investments in action research, GIEWS WS and GeoNetwork on the other hand were not well conceived and proven to be inappropriate to their intended purpose.

Although SIFSIA-S identified the importance of developing a **nutrition information system** in conjunction with health sector partners, the weak institutional links between the health and agricultural sectors in South Sudan have meant that little has been achieved in raising the awareness and understanding of food-based approaches to nutrition. Similarly, the importance of the **gender** dimension to the agricultural economy in South Sudan remains little understood: real opportunities to incorporate a “gender lens” in the information and analysis of food security in South Sudan have not been taken up.

Overall, the **programme concept** is considered highly relevant to the context and building essential capacity across nascent government institutions, but it’s original objectives were over ambitious within the time-frame and insufficiently resourced. Furthermore, the original intention that SIFSIA-S **connect** with other initiatives such as the Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Project (SPCRP) and the Support to Agriculture and Forestry Development Project (SAFDP) never really materialised until after the mid-term evaluation (MTE). Then SIFSIA-S was obliged to re-allocate resources to build capacity and support activities at state level which could have been done more effectively through collaboration earlier in the project cycles. SIFSIA-S subsequently covered all ten states, but insufficient attention was accorded to the vulnerable “transitional” areas which the two elements: SIFSIA-S and SIFSIA-N were uniquely positioned to advocate for from a common platform.

There has been evidence of **utilisation** of SIFSIA-S outputs contributing to policy decisions by GoSS at both the state and national levels. Furthermore information generated by the FSTS through support by SIFSIA-S is now utilised by the international humanitarian community (both UN and NGOs), but the visibility of the information products is relatively “low” outside the principal GoSS line ministries or partners working in conjunction with SIFSIA. **Collaboration** with WFP/VAM and FEWSNET through the FSTS, LAF on the IPC, USAID/FARM on policy development and through the Food Security & Livelihoods Cluster in support of information dissemination, are indeed very positive developments.

SIFSIA-South over the past five years has made significant achievements in building institutional capacities and partnerships, which go a long way in achieving **sustainability** for the programme. Of key importance is now the appointment of a Secretary General for the FSC and the institutional arrangements linking the FSTS with the Council reducing its dependence upon the SIFSIA-S Project Support Unit (PSU). However, insufficient attention was given to addressing the phase-out strategy in time and particularly explicit arrangements to ensure that GoSS covers the operating costs of the most critical activities to ensure continued information collection, analysis and dissemination at both state and national level.

With respect to the overall **management** of SIFSIA-S, the evaluation considers that GoSS, FAO and the EC should have met more frequently (as recommended by the MTE) especially to review the phase-out strategy and to ensure the sustainability of the FSTS. Both the Steering and Technical Committees have functioned very effectively and linked SIFSIA-S to other project initiatives. Furthermore SIFSIA-S has been well supported by the FAO Task Force in Rome as well as management and operational support from the TCE Division. However, FAO left the PSU very short of technical capacity in the final months during the critical period of phase-out.

The evaluation makes three sets of **recommendations**. Those concerning the remainder of the SIFSIA-S programme (until February 2012); those in support of the South Sudan Food Security Policy and Strategy Capacity Building Programme (for which a framework document has been agreed and start-up is anticipated by mid-2012); and generic recommendations which will contribute to the design of other similar initiatives.



# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background to SIFSIA

1. The SIFSIA programme – the Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action – commenced in December 2006. It is essentially a capacity-building programme to support government in building food security and market information systems, and in strengthening policy and planning initiatives to contribute to improved food security<sup>1</sup>. Thus, as the programme name suggests, SIFSIA is about more than technical food security information systems; it has been specifically designed to inform and influence government decision-making and food security policies. The intended outcomes of the SIFSIA programme are:

- an overall policy framework for food security defined and operational
- an institutional set-up for food security established and functioning to enhance coordination and to strengthen vertical and horizontal linkages
- effective policies and programmes designed, monitored, evaluated and updated for: (i) rehabilitation and strengthening smallholders' livelihoods; (ii) managing natural resources in a sustainable and equitable manner; (iii) protecting the vulnerable; and (iv) monitoring relevant Millennium Development Goal (MDG) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) indicators
- relevant food security information easily accessed and used by all relevant stakeholders.

2. Following the 'one country, two systems' principle in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005, SIFSIA was divided into two sub-programmes at the outset, one focussed on capacity-building of the federal Government of National Unity (GNU) in Khartoum in the north – SIFSIA-North (SIFSIA-N) – and one focussed on capacity-building of the new Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) in Juba in the south – SIFSIA-South, although with similar objectives. This division was reinforced by secession of the Republic of South Sudan (ROSS) in July 2011. This report covers the final evaluation of SIFSIA-S; a separate report has been written evaluating SIFSIA-N.

3. Supported by Stabex funds, SIFSIA is intended to contribute to the European Commission's (EC's) overall development objective in Sudan of *consolidated peace with sustainable and equitable development*<sup>2</sup>. The Stabex funding amounts to EUR 20 million, equally divided between North and South. The total project budget was supposed to be EUR 20.6 million, to include substantial contributions from the GNU in Khartoum and GoSS in Juba although these were not forthcoming<sup>3</sup>. The revised end date of the project was 30 November 2011. The UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) was contracted both with programme formulation, and with full implementation of the SIFSIA programme.

4. A mid-term evaluation (MTE) of the SIFSIA programme was carried out in January 2009, drawing lessons from the experience of the first phase of the programme and making recommendations for the second phase. This final evaluation focuses on the second phase – the period since the MTE, from January/ February 2009 to October/ November 2011.

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<sup>1</sup> As stated in the project design document.

<sup>2</sup> SIFSIA is also seen as relevant to the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG 1), to reduce poverty and hunger.

<sup>3</sup> 3% of total funding was expected to come from the Italian government, but this was not realised. FAO filled this financial gap from its own resources.

## **1.2 Final Evaluation and Methodology**

5. According to the Terms of Reference (TOR), the overall purpose of this final evaluation of the SIFSIA programme is to review project delivery of the expected outputs and provide decision makers in the respective governments (in Khartoum and in Juba), and the EC with sufficient information to make an informed judgement about the performance of the project (its relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact), and to make decisions about future related interventions and the future of food security information in North and South Sudan, acknowledging the recent division into two separate States. The full TOR are attached as **Annex 1** to this report.

6. In the initial round of interviews with the key stakeholders, however, it became apparent to the evaluation team that learning should be the main purpose of the evaluation, particularly in terms of learning from the SIFSIA experience that can feed into and inform the new food security policy and capacity-building programmes to be implemented in Sudan and South Sudan, commencing in early 2012 (and possibly wider learning that is relevant to other food security projects planned and implemented in Sudan in the future). Stakeholders in-country also requested that the evaluation provides guidance to the SIFSIA programme in its last few months in both Sudan and South Sudan, and for the respective exit strategies. And there is interest in the generic learning from the SIFSIA experience. The programme is regarded by many as the first of its kind in attempting to build capacity in terms of food security information and analysis *and* strengthening food security policy-making, in a 'post-conflict' and challenging environment. What can be learned from this experience in order to inform future projects of this kind?

7. The evaluation team developed an evaluation matrix to guide the line of enquiry for this exercise. The evaluation matrix is a rationalisation and to some extent re-arranging of the many questions and issues listed in the TOR, organised according to the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, and indicating the main sources drawn upon in order to answer each of these evaluation questions. The evaluation matrix is attached as **Annex 2** to this report. This final evaluation has particularly focused on the issue of utilisation of food security information and policy analyses produced and supported by the SIFSIA project, regarded as critical to the effectiveness of the project. It has also focused on the prospects for sustaining the capacity that the SIFSIA project has built within government when the project officially ends.

8. The evaluation team focused most of its efforts at the national level in Juba, reflecting the federal focus of the SIFSIA programme. Meetings and interviews were held with SIFSIA programme participants, other institutions concerned with food security in South Sudan, and actual and potential users of SIFSIA information & analysis. Two state visits were carried out, to Lakes State and to Upper Nile State as well as interviewing the state level offices of Central Equatoria in Juba itself. In addition, the SIFSIA focal points in all states were contacted and given the opportunity to feedback their perspectives on the SIFSIA programme. See **Annexes 3 and 4** for the list of respondents to this evaluation and the schedule of the mission in South Sudan. A debriefing of stakeholders was conducted in Juba on 24 November 2011 and a debriefing to the FAO Project Task Force in Rome was conducted on 19 December 2011.

## **2 Political, institutional and policy context**

9. On 9 July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan (RoSS) officially declared independence from Sudan, formally ending the five year period determined by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). However, the new South Sudan faces many challenges; not least the destruction of

physical and market infrastructure during the prolonged civil war (as well as the lack of investment by the government in the north) and the consequent lack of social services (in particular health and education) which have slowed the progress of agricultural sector recovery and other food security initiatives. The household economy of South Sudan is very much based on subsistence farming (85% of households), livestock (65% of households) and an undetermined proportion on fishing. These sectors are not yet contributing to economic growth in South Sudan, whose government now relies heavily on oil revenue, which in 2011 contributes to 98% of the national budget<sup>4</sup>.

10. The land and other natural resources of South Sudan offer considerable opportunities to build sustainable livelihoods and improve the food and nutrition security of the people. Only about 4% of the total land area of 644,329 km<sup>2</sup> in South Sudan is cultivated<sup>5</sup>, yet half of the land is considered prime agricultural land and other areas offer significant potential for pasture, forestry and fishing.

## **2.1 Triggers of food insecurity since 2009**

11. The underlying causes of food insecurity in South Sudan are poverty<sup>6</sup>, the poor infrastructure (in particular roads and bridges to ensure market access), lack of agricultural financing to farmers, inadequate agricultural extension services and conflict leading to displacement. These have been exacerbated in the short term by the hike in global prices of essential commodities, irregular rains (leading to both floods and unseasonal dry periods arguably the result of climate change) and occasionally crop and livestock diseases (such as the East Coast Fever outbreak in Jonglei in recent months). Deficits in food crop production by as much as 30% have been estimated in both the last joint Crop and Food Security Assessment Missions (CFSAMs) of 2010 and 2011 conducted by GoSS with technical support from FAO and WFP. The CFSAM of 2010 estimated that 47% of South Sudan's population of 8.3 million (of which 83% is rural)<sup>7</sup> is food insecure.

12. Other factors which have contributed to food insecurity in the past three years include:

- A steady flow of returnees since the signing of the CPA; it is estimated that more than three million South Sudanese have returned from the north, neighbouring countries or further afield. Many of the returnees (and the internally displaced) favour a return to urban areas and labour opportunities rather than returning to farming or pastoralism (often because of continued insecurity in rural areas)<sup>8</sup>;
- A weakened system of land administration, both customary and statutory, has led to confusion over land ownership and led to tensions/conflict; and
- Inter-tribal conflict in some areas of South Sudan (especially Warrap, Jonglei and Upper Nile) which has affected livestock and fishing production as well as areas of cultivation<sup>9</sup>.

13. Underlying this is a critical issue of gender inequality. Despite the fact that women are principal food producers and preparers in South Sudan<sup>10</sup>, they continue to face social and cultural barriers that prevent them from realising their full economic potential. Agricultural extension services have to adapt dramatically to target the principal agents of household food and nutrition security.

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<sup>4</sup> South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013

<sup>5</sup> SIFSIA Land Cover Atlas of South Sudan (draft July 2011) and CBS statistics on total land area

<sup>6</sup> 52% of the population of South Sudan live on less than \$1 per day of which 80% rely on agriculture for their livelihood (2009 Household Baseline Survey)

<sup>7</sup> 5<sup>th</sup> Sudan Population & Housing Census (2008)

<sup>8</sup> City limits: urbanization and vulnerability in Sudan; Juba case study (HPG January 2011)

<sup>9</sup> inter-ethnic clashes between the Lou Nuer and Murle communities forced tens of thousands of the Murle to flee the area around Pibor in Jonglei at the start of 2012 (BBC report 2 January 2012)

<sup>10</sup> It is often reported that women produce 60 to 80% of the food crops in South Sudan

## **2.2     *Food security and other implications of secession of South Sudan***

14.     A significant consequence of secession is the **border blockade** imposed by the Government of Sudan after the independence of South Sudan on trade flowing from north to south. Northern areas of South Sudan have always been very reliant on commodities from the north, including fuel and cereals, since the road and transport infrastructure are much better developed to the north. The initial result of the blockade sent the cost of basic commodities soaring<sup>11</sup>. Whilst prices still remain high, supplies are now reaching northern border areas from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Furthermore, smuggling across the border from the north is easier during the dry season, and local taxation levied on the transport of essential commodities has been banned by state authorities in the affected areas. This provides some temporary easing of the situation.

15.     Another result of secession was that many **traders from northern Sudan** closed businesses in South Sudan during the referendum process (some permanently) and many were critical for the supply of agricultural inputs resulting in reduced agricultural productivity<sup>12</sup>. Furthermore, financial support through **agricultural credit** to (Arab) farmers in areas of Upper Nile has now been withdrawn by the Government of Sudan and many of the farmers have left (especially Renk and Manyo counties) abandoning productive agriculture potential.

The Government of Sudan's decision not to grant or renew **work permits** to South Sudanese post-independence has forced many to return south whose education and employment were dependent on a unified country. It is difficult to estimate the impact that the reduction in remittances from the north to livelihoods in the south will have, but it is clearly a significant factor.

## **2.3     *Institutional and policy context and how it has changed since 2009***

16.     The principal focus of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) since 2005 has been to deliver on the commitments of the CPA, and not least to conduct the referendum, which determined the country's independence in July this year. Alongside this the GoSS has had to build the human, physical and institutional capacity of all its sector ministries at both the state and federal (now national) level as well as ensure security. Remarkably, during this period a national census and subsequent elections were also conducted, major surveys with respect to health and poverty were undertaken, multi-donor reconstruction and rehabilitation projects progressed, and a South Sudan Development Plan was drafted in consultation with all principal development partners. The preparations for independence and the transfer of government from a semi-autonomous authority to a sovereign national authority have been a significant challenge in the last 12 months.

17.     Another development at the national level of particular relevance to the SIFSIA project has been the amalgamation of the Ministry of Cooperatives & Rural Development with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF). However, the most significant (and perhaps detrimental) change is the split at state level between the Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry (MAF) and that of Animal Resources & Fisheries (MARF), which took place from July 2010. The joint Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Resources & Fisheries already lacked the human and financial resources to effectively deliver extension services and monitoring at a decentralised level. Furthermore, there is now a greater likelihood that the state level policies and strategies of both ministries may be developed

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<sup>11</sup> One example was that the cost of fuel in Malakal rose by 300% between April and August 2011 according to the RCA conducted in Upper Nile in August 2011 (but this has now reduced to approximately 200%)

<sup>12</sup> See South Sudan Rapid Crop assessment Report (September 2011)

in isolation from each other rather than working in tandem to support better food security and livelihoods for rural populations.

18. Two services previously headed by authorities in Khartoum include the Sudan Meteorological Authority (SMA) and the Plant Protection Unit (PPU). Since independence, South Sudanese staff of the SMA have now relocated to Juba and the South SMA has been accommodated with the Ministry of Transport and Roads since its principal service is to provide weather forecasting for aviation. The Plant Protection Unit (whose services include aerial crop spraying) is no longer available to service areas of the south. The GoSS is now negotiating with Uganda and Ethiopia to provide comparable services.

### 3 How SIFSIA has accommodated the MTE

#### 3.1 Response to the MTE recommendations

MTE Recommendations	Management Response	Comments by the Final Evaluation
<b>Timeframe</b>		
Period for phase two be extended from two to four years	Extension until end of 2012 may not be feasible without extra funding especially with additional engagement at state level	It is now known that SIFSIA-S project funds are only sufficient to cover operations until end of January 2012
<b>Direction for Phase Two</b>		
Greater emphasis on capacity-building at state level and review cost-effectiveness of “land cover”	Reallocation of resources to support capacity building and generation of information will be made. Land cover required to generate baseline information for crop, range and natural resources monitoring	Capacity building at state level has been effectively carried out and the justification for continuing with “land cover” has been well demonstrated (without a cost effectiveness analysis)
Greater emphasis on food security policy analysis and including other stakeholders in the policy debate	Policy review and benchmarking is underway with the FSTS	Policy analysis has been more effectively supported by ESA in phase two, but does not sufficiently embrace non-governmental actors
More attention on livestock and fisheries as a source of livelihoods and issues of poverty, vulnerability and social protection	Extending SIFSIA’s work to urban poverty and social protection will reduce the focus of the project on principal areas of food security	Livestock and fisheries surveys currently being completed. SIFSIA does not currently have the capacity to analyse issues of poverty (including urban poverty) and social protection
More support to the “Three Areas”	SIFSIA is already overstretched in ten states, it is not feasible to work in these politically sensitive areas	The overall SIFSIA project (with its sub-components north and south) was uniquely placed to analyse the food security consequences of secession, so it is a limitation that these areas have proven too challenging for SIFSIA
Raise SIFSIA’s visibility and profile	Visibility with heads of NGOs, UN agencies and donors should be raised	Some visibility has been gained in phase two with the support of an ESA Communications Specialist, but access to and dissemination of information could have been more effective

<b>Institutional set-up</b>		
Operationalising the Food Security Council (FSC)	On-going lobbying through the chair of the SIFSIA Steering Committee	A concerted effort to establish the FSC is critical before project end
Quarterly tripartite meetings between the SIFSIA/SPCRP SC chairs, FAO and EC	Steering Committee level coordination is already built into the project's governance structures	A better understanding of the project from the different perspectives of GoSS, EU and FAO would have been achieved through these tripartite meetings
<b>Sharpening SIFSIA-S's focus</b>		
Develop a food security conceptual framework	SIFSIA-S is already using a livelihoods approach to analyse the food security situation	There is still insufficient common understanding across stakeholders of the food security concept
Closer PSU mentoring of the Food Security Technical Secretariat (FSTS)	PSU staff are regularly visiting and coaching FSTS staff	The working relationship between PSU and the FSTS has been very effective during phase two
Revitalise the Livelihoods Analysis Forum (LAF)	PSU has been and still is supporting the LAF through the SSCCSE	The IPC training and analysis has benefited from close collaboration between LAF and SIFSIA
Improve the Food Security Bulletin including early warning function	Deepening the analysis depends on the quality of information that can be generated at state level in phase two	The South Sudan Food Security Bulletin now includes short-term food security analysis, but it is not yet based on regular and consistent monitoring at state level
SIFSIA training must be related to outputs and performance	SPCRP has undertaken a comprehensive capacity and training needs assessment and SIFSIA training plans are consistent with this assessment	SIFSIA preceded SPCR and should have developed its training programme from a needs assessment specific to building capacity for generating and analysing food security information in support of policy development and decision-making at both state and federal levels
Research fund should be more strategic and address identified gaps in knowledge	No more calls for proposals for action research beyond 2009	Future research activities should be employed to address areas where critical information is lacking
Clear strategy for phase two and revise log-frame	Log-frame was already revised and endorsed by the SC in phase one	A log-frame revision would have provided better coherence across the project
<b>Project management</b>		
More effective FAO backstopping including AGN	AGN lack the capacity to backstop the project effectively	Insufficient prioritisation of nutrition concerns at all levels in SIFSIA

### 3.2 *Overall comments on the impact of the MTE*

19. SIFSIA-S took on approximately half the recommendations of the MTE with generally positive results. Some recommendations were not taken forward because of lack of additional resources. Others that could have enhanced the project's performance drawing on existing resources, such as promoting more effectively the food security concept and holding regular tripartite meetings, were not realised. The most significant changes to the project in phase two were the shift in emphasis to capacity-building at state level and its contribution to initiating food and nutrition security analysis at this level through the integrated food security phase classification (IPC) in collaboration with the Livelihoods Analysis Forum (LAF). Information on the contribution of livestock and fisheries to livelihoods still remains limited (awaiting the analysis of recent surveys). Despite the recommendations of the MTE, the continued commitment to achieving the land cover dataset and atlas

has had unreserved support across stakeholders and does seem appropriate (see output 6 in section 4.2 below). More attention was also given to reviewing sector policies at national level and the development of an agricultural policy framework. Visibility of the project through its information products remains limited, and the lack of quarterly tripartite meetings (GoSS, EC, FAO) would have generated a better understanding of project expectations from the different perspectives of the principal stakeholders. No functioning Food Security Council again raises questions about the GoSS's political commitment to the initiative.

## **4 Implementation of SIFSIA: effectiveness and efficiency**

### **4.1 Introduction**

20. This section reviews the discussions and findings of the evaluation in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency of the project to deliver results from its anticipated outputs. It concentrates on achievements and short-comings during the period since the MTE, but provides an overall assessment of the output during the total project period.

### **4.2 Evaluation of results**

**Purpose:**            **Sustainable cross-sectoral capacity for food security analysis, policy, planning and programme implementation in South Sudan**

21. The institution of a Food Security Information System (FSIS) for Action programme relies on the multi-sector data collection, analysis and information provision to decision-makers and policy developers on baselines, production forecasts and early warnings. To be effective and practical in contributing to food security, it is necessary to see this information in an integrated fashion through a widely adopted conceptual/analytical framework. The lack of current integrative technologies and effective mechanisms to translate information into strategy and policy development means that there is still a need to coordinate this information and link across the components in development of policies. The institution of the FSC and FSTS are central elements in ensuring a cross-sectoral coordination and appreciation of how the project components contribute to the overall food security analysis at government level. Whilst there has been extensive training to develop technical capacity, there has been correspondingly less attention to the policy framework and the assessment of vulnerability and risk. The sustainability of this capacity appears to be linked closely to the operationalisation of the FSC, through which realistic budgets and institutional reporting lines can be established.

### **Output 1:        Functional institutional and operational framework for food security**

22. The establishment of the Food Security Council (FSC) by Presidential Decree in 2008 marked an early appreciation of the cross-sectoral nature and importance of food security issues by the GoSS. However, since that time it has not been possible to appoint a Secretary General to the Council. This has created a vacuum in overseeing the development of the government position on food security, the provision of integrated approaches and organisation of the relationships between the individual components of the information system on food and nutrition security (ISFNS) and the policy development process. Nonetheless, the FSC has made some urgent policy decisions on the removal of taxes on imported food commodities and increased budget allocation to relevant line ministries concerned with food security over the past two years. The original SIFSIA project design anticipated the establishment of state level Food Security Councils in the most food insecure areas of the country, but this was amended following a review of the project log-frame when priority was accorded just to the GoSS level. However one state, Central Equatoria, took the initiative to establish an FSC and this was assisted by SIFSIA.

23. A Steering Committee has been operational since the outset of the SIFSIA project which includes the relevant line ministries and is co-chaired by the Minister of Agriculture & Forestry (MoAF) and the Minister of Animal Resources and Fisheries (MoARF). The committee meets at the end of each project year to review project progress and review work plans and budgets for the subsequent year. The more regular project “business” is overseen by a Technical Committee (also co-chaired by the two ministries at Undersecretary level), which meets two to three times annually. A phase-out plan for the project has been discussed within the Technical Committee, but not as yet at the Steering Committee level<sup>13</sup> (this is discussed further in sections 9 and 10 of this report).

24. The relative absence of the FSC has left the Food Security Technical Secretariat (FSTS) hosted within the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) without any “steer” from a multi-sectoral body within the GoSS and it has consequently become very reliant upon the Project Support Unit (PSU) of SIFSIA, which is now phasing out. Nevertheless, the FSTS has been able to establish a strong reputation through the working groups (crop production, livestock and fisheries, nutrition and policy) and increased links with the wider food security community, but remains small and vulnerable to staff turnover.

25. The capacity development activities of SIFSIA have been extensive at national line ministry levels, with training delivered to relevant ministries (MoAF, MoARF, MoH, NBS and the South Sudan Relief & Rehabilitation Commission). The training has primarily focused on technical disciplines, but with wide general capacity enhancement and food security awareness raising. Due to high attrition rates, the skill sets are now established only within a few key individuals – leaving considerable vulnerability within the planning and statistical units of principal stakeholders. Equally, the capacity development at state level to the food security teams and focal persons have also been vulnerable to staff losses.

26. Although a SIFSIA website (<http://www.fao.org/sudanfoodsecurity/en/>) has been established and hosted by FAO, the CLIMIS website (<http://www.southsudan-climis.org/>) is becoming the *de facto* location for collation of food security information generated by the programme. The range of bulletins and outputs included suggest the branding as a market information system is confused, but going forward; the rebranded CLIMIS website remains the best portal for information.

## **Output 2: Strengthened GoSS capacity for food security analysis and programming**

27. This output seeks to build the capacity within the principal line ministries and FSTS to develop policies and strategies informed by relevant food security and livelihoods analysis. When SIFSIA began, there was no government-led food security information in South Sudan, this was very much the domain of international agencies such as the USAID-funded Famine Early Warning System (FEWSNet) and the WFP Vulnerability Assessment Mapping (VAM). In less than five years the FSTS, with SIFSIA support, has begun generating Food Security Updates, Nutrition Bulletins, Agro-Meteorological Bulletins, Special Market Reports and Policy Briefs. The principal outputs are listed in **Annex 5** to this report. The FSTS also played a pivotal role in the compilation of the Food and Nutrition Security Assessment of Sudan (February 2011). Furthermore, the MoARF Resource Centre has taken the initiative to generate its own South(ern) Sudan Livestock & Fisheries Bulletin which assesses markets and rangeland performance based upon information and analysis generated by the FSTS. These products are increasingly contributing to decision-making and policy development not only within GoSS but also within the international aid community (including the UN system). The information and analysis contributing to these products also still remains limited in scope and the

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<sup>13</sup> The phase-out plan was discussed at the Steering Committee meeting held on 14 December 2011 after the evaluation was completed.



quality assurance is minimal (see output three), but it is a significant start and a good foundation upon which to build.

28. A key development in the second phase of the project has been towards policy review and development. In 2010, a review was conducted by a SIFSIA consultant of GoSS sector policies to identify gaps in food security policy. The review was timely and noted shortcomings in the formatting of policies, especially the lack of vision, mission statements, goals and objectives as well as the institutional arrangements to deliver on policies. The review took into account the different dimensions of food security including availability, accessibility, utilisation and stability against each of the selected GoSS sector policies, but paid insufficient attention to how cross-cutting issues important to food security (especially gender and social inclusion) were addressed. It was also observed that the review is not being used as a core reference for policy development processes currently being undertaken in the agricultural sector.

29. Subsequently, SIFSIA has supported the development of the Food & Agriculture Policy Framework (FAPF) 2011-2015, thematic policy development currently been undertaken (in collaboration with the USAID/FARM project) and has contributed to the South Sudan Development Plan 2011-2013 which has been a significant multi-sectoral initiative at the start of the year. For each of these exercises FAO has drawn upon different sources of technical assistance (funded either from SIFSIA or separately by FAO), which has led to some inconsistencies in approach. Furthermore, the emphasis so far has been focused on the agricultural sector, in particular crop production, there has been insufficient attention accorded to nutrition and/or gender (see later sections), and no contribution towards policy development in the livestock and fisheries sector<sup>14</sup>.

30. It is the view of the evaluation that SIFSIA would have been considerably more effective if it had initiated its support to this output at a decentralised level, working in closer collaboration with the EU-funded Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Programme (SPCRP), which has supported ministries (MoAF/MoARF) at state level to develop strategies in these sectors.

### **Output 3: Strengthened GoSS capacity to conduct food security and livelihood analysis**

31. This output seeks to build the capacity within the line ministries and through FSTS, and to a lesser extent within the line ministries at state level to conduct food security and livelihoods analysis. An early initiative in the SIFSIA project (incorporating both the northern and southern sub-components) was to support the analysis of the National Baseline Household Survey (NBHS), which led to the Food and Nutrition Security Assessment in Sudan (2011). This assessment (in the south) was prepared by staff of the National Bureau of Statistics (then the SSCCSE) and the FSTS. It was a substantive exercise which categorises the prevalence of food deprivation across states in the south based upon dietary energy consumption (DEC) and provides one important perspective on food security analysis. A resilience analysis of the NBHS is also currently being undertaken by FAO, but the final version was not available to the evaluation team.

32. The output was also partially achieved through training and development of applications to support situation and early warning assessments, notably through the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), which principally at this stage draws upon Rapid Crop Assessments (RCA), Crop and Food Security Assessment Missions (CFSAM), the Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessments (ANLA), the Crop & Livestock Market Information System (CLiMIS) as well as ad hoc nutrition surveys. The degree of primary information contributing to the IPC was very limited in the two states visited by the evaluation, but this may vary according to the resources available to the focal points and access to the field.

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<sup>14</sup> MoARF is currently being supported by the NGO, VSF Belgium, in the development of its new strategy

33. The IPC process is coordinated by the Livelihoods Analysis Forum (LAF) facilitated by Livelihood Analysis Unit (LAU) of the NBS. The process and products appear to be widely appreciated by government, the UN system and NGOs and the co-ordination meetings also appear to be embraced by the wider food security community and have increasing NGO involvement<sup>15</sup>. Decentralised meetings at state level during 2010 and 2011 have fostered involvement and a sense of ownership. These are supported by FSTS through a close collaboration with LAU to provide technical support to the Forum, with phase classification mapping being delivered from FSTS GIS capacity. The quarterly meetings and issue of IPC outputs provides both a situation analysis and to some extent bridges the acute and chronic food insecurity picture based on the livelihood zones<sup>16</sup>.

34. The current level of acceptance of the value of IPC has encouraged partners to recognise the need for high-resolution data and the utility of extending the data collections and inputs to the IPC process to county level. SIFSIA has contributed to the awareness training and capacity building to start this process. Such acceptance is illustrated by the World Food Programme (WFP) working with the FSTS to develop a curricula and food security module that aims to train up to 330 people (currently delivered to 60 people in Lakes and Eastern Equatoria) and will develop training of trainers material to lift capacity at county level. Such actions bode well for the sustainability and the improvement of standardisation of county level contributions to LAF – that currently are qualitative and of unknown quality, coverage and currency. An IPC Technical Working Group also aims to address some of these issues and data gaps, which have included contributions from line ministries other than MoAF (MoARF, MoH etc). These approaches may also further help address the lead times<sup>17</sup> between acquisition and production of IPC outputs.

35. However, the quality and consistency of the data feeding into the IPC has not been assessed or quality assured, and appears highly variable in geographic coverage, timing, or sector cover, which may undermine the effectiveness of the IPC result. This may be especially the case where the data are ‘aggregated’ at a level (livelihood zones) that bears little correspondence to the state boundaries, proving difficult to evaluate where data is collected by administrative area. Furthermore, given the current dependency the IPC has in South Sudan on information and analysis attributed to crop production, there remains insufficient information on nutrition (especially in the absence of dietary diversity scores), on livestock production and animal health, which are all critical areas. The lack of a nutrition information system (output 7) also reduces the effectiveness of integration of nutrition information into the IPC process.

36. Nevertheless, IPC outputs have helped to highlight food security issues and given the collaborative forum the approach receives buy-in from all line ministries. The apparent lack of feedback to the state level may undermine the effectiveness at this level. A review<sup>18</sup> of the IPC and the adoption of version II was supported by a mission to Nairobi (February 2011), and is envisaged to provide a simpler and more effective framework for food security and livelihood assessment.

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<sup>15</sup> As an illustration of the breadth of IPC engagement at state level IPC meetings had representation from MoAF, MoARF, NGOs and UN agencies; Concern Worldwide, GAP Nile Basin, ACF (US), FARM-Africa and the FAO, WFP, OCHA and FEWS NET. Donors’ representatives include USDA, USAID, IFPRI and EC.

<sup>16</sup> Muchomba and Sharp (2007) Southern Sudan Livelihood Profiles SSCCE, SCUK, mapping of livelihood zones funded by ECHO, Fewsnets and SCUK.

<sup>17</sup> Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) End of Project Evaluation. Timothy R. Frankenberger René Verduijn Final April 1, 2011.

<sup>18</sup> The Integrated Food Security and Phase Classification (IPC): A review April 2007

37. At the MTE, two data sharing and analysis tools were envisaged to support this output, namely GeoNetwork and GIEWS Workstation (GIEWS WS). The backstopping mission from FAO in February 2008 and the training of 20 staff from GoSS in June 2008 apparently confirmed the value of GIEWS WS in support of FSTS capabilities for data exchange and reporting. Installation of the GIEWS WS in MoAF, MoARF and NBS followed in 2009, but the protracted and partial implementation of the GIEWS WS led to its subsequent abandonment. GIEWS WS's inherent complexity, incomplete development and uncertain continuity of support<sup>19</sup> has worked against its effective inclusion in the ISFNS toolset. It was an unrealistic expectation that the line ministries and the FSTS would be able to adopt the system unaided. No formal assessment has been made of the functionality lost or impact of not implementing GIEWS WS. GeoNetwork development, to support the data discovery and distribution, was also initially being supported by international consultancy and was similarly not pursued by the PSU, although the CLiMIS website has taken a role in data dissemination and FAO HQ GeoNetwork nodes can partially support this function.

#### **Output 4:      Functioning crop and livestock market information system**

38. CLiMIS, the online crop and livestock market information system (<http://www.southsudan-climis.org>), has been fully implemented since the MTE, at which stage tenders for development were still under review, and this is a considerable achievement. IITA have developed a system<sup>20</sup> that now represents a fully-functional application, with operational SMS module, which has been widely used and demonstrated, and forms one of the most recognised project outputs. It is the only system in South Sudan providing such an extensive network of market monitoring and analysis<sup>21</sup>. The components of the system include the consistent and standardised capture of market prices at state level, the upload and quality assurance of data at national level and the online publication and download facility for market price data via an SMS messaging service. The system is effectively maintained within the MoAF, supported by database staff and is based on equipment provided by SIFSIA, but now entirely maintained by MoAF. The Market Information Unit of MoAF had provided market information in the past, but SIFSIA support has considerably enhanced the efficiency of the communications systems and accessibility of the data by establishing CLiMIS and by issuing regular bulletins. The on-going technical web development has been addressed through training in May 2011 of IT staff within MoAF, NBS and FAO.

39. Since the MTE and the delivery of the system, extensive training has been undertaken providing fundamental skills for enumerators, awareness and responding to remedial capacity needs to support state level collection and dissemination. The development of a training manual for CLiMIS focal persons<sup>22</sup> in each state has helped build capacity in market analysis and reporting. Data collection and upload training for focal persons at state level was undertaken for 45 staff in Feb 2010 and refresher training was conducted in March 2010 to address data shortfalls in selected states, with subsequent training for state line ministries in April 2011. Nevertheless, there are still gaps in the frequency and coverage of the commodities data, for example, not all markets receive the weekly reports. Loss of staff, at the state data collection stage remains a threat to the commodity records, although the capacity at the CLiMIS Secretariat (MoAF/MoARF/FSTS) level allow for training independent of the development consultants, but there remains a need for attention to quality control.

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<sup>19</sup> Yergalem T. Beraki (2009) BTO Rome assessment identifying available resource and technical assistance areas that could be of importance for the SIFSIA-South programme

<sup>20</sup> IITA (2010) Designing and Implementing the crop and Livestock market Information System for Southern Sudan. Wanda, K. Mukasa, A. Bisase, D. Luwandagga. D. Okoboi, G. and Manyong, V.M. (May 2010).

<sup>21</sup> WFP also operates a market monitoring system, but this is principally based upon food aid commodities

<sup>22</sup> Market Price Analysis for Food Security: A training manual for crop and livestock market information system CLiMIS) focal persons. SIFSIA November 2010

40. State-based field enumerators now collect for 23 wholesale and 30 retail commodities (17 crop and 13 livestock/products) from state capital markets; updated on a weekly basis into the backend database. Weekly market reports for livestock and crops are generated from the data and accessible from the website, but not all states are consistently recording information. The effectiveness of the information is restricted by the limitation of data to state capital markets; there is a strong desire to progress to county level markets, which is beyond the scope of the current SIFSIA project. Such development is frustrated by access constraints and technical capacity within state line ministries and in some state's commitment to data provision.

41. Data is freely viewable and downloadable from the website, supporting advanced queries and export to Excel format and has been proposed for radio bulletins, but this has not yet been achieved. The data has been used in the Food Security Updates, Special Market Reports and Policy Briefs generated by the FSTS. These and other FSTS outputs are now included on the CLiMIS website which has, by default, become the delivery mechanism for many of the SIFSIA-S products, with the added advantage that it is managed in country. However, it is not yet systematically managed to provide a reliable platform for all food and nutrition security information products generated in South Sudan.

#### **Output 5:      Functioning crop and livestock monitoring and forecasting system**

42. The objective of this output was to strengthen capacity to undertake crop and livestock assessment and to provide effective use of agro-meteorology and rainfall data to support crop assessment and early warning and to facilitate aggregation of these datasets within bulletins and status reports. Outputs have been a compilation of approaches and rather less a coherent strategic application of more regular monitoring and reporting. This reflects the inherent low capacity at the start of the programme to support yield and production estimates and the strong reliance on annual large-scale assessment missions (CFSAM/ANLA). Although capacity has been developed for collection, analysis and reporting for which SIFSIA (FSTS, MoAF Database Unit and the MoARF Resource Centre) has developed a good reputation, there are still areas of weakness in the capacity at state levels, limitation in the flows of information and staff retention.

43. CFSAM (FAO/WFP) provides a recognised annual collaborative<sup>23</sup> survey of crop assessment and overall food security situation with technical and logistical facilitation through SIFSIA/FSTS. CFSAM is also a key user of the SIFSIA-supported rainfall and NDVI data to indicate the vegetation trends within the season and of market price data. However, it has been more difficult to establish a consistent approach to crop estimation in the context of the capacity at state levels and it is questioned whether the approaches (beyond CFSAM) are yet in place for on-going annual crop estimation programmes to be run by line ministries and state ministries. Rapid Crop Assessments (RCA) have also been conducted with SIFSIA support over the past two years in response to poor rainfall performance on production and livestock. A particular challenge has been the effective crop area estimation<sup>24</sup>, and the NRM data may provide a basis for improving these estimates, particularly in the dominant rain-fed agricultural sector. Extensive numbers (56 people at state level) have been trained in crop agricultural statistics, area estimation and PET, and the application of the PET crop yield that may be a more effective approach for this context than crop cutting. ANLAs<sup>25</sup> in 2009 and 2010 have to some extent provided the link between the crop production and household livelihood classifications, based on the livelihood zones.

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<sup>23</sup> CFSAM is a collaborative assessment of Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MoAF), the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), the Southern Sudan Centre for Census, Statistics and Evaluation (SSCCSE) FEWS/NET, EC/JRC, FAO and WFP.

<sup>24</sup> CFSAM uses the Census of Population 2008 to estimate crop areas based on numbers of farming households, but this information is increasingly affected by returnees (with figures from IOM)

<sup>25</sup> ANLA (Annual Needs and Livelihoods Assessment) 2009, covered seven states and ANLA 2010.

44. There has been correspondingly less focus on surveillance of livestock, disease and very sparse assessment of fisheries outside of the market information although these are key determinants of household food security in South Sudan. Resource limitations within the ambitious scope of the project have restricted such surveillance, although livestock and fisheries survey were instituted in 2011. Training in rangeland monitoring (including courses in October and November 2010 to MoARF staff) and field validation approaches have allowed the application NDVI to assess broad area rangeland pasture condition assessment reported through the MoARF Resource Centre within their regular Livestock and Fisheries Bulletins<sup>26</sup>. More recent surveys on livestock and fisheries are being compiled, together with a study on the livestock migration, which goes some way to redress the shortfall. Early assessments (joint with the SIFSIA-N) on agricultural statistics<sup>27</sup> have subsequently been reviewed in May 2011<sup>28</sup>, to evaluate an agricultural area-sampling frame and include proposals for census of livestock and fisheries.

45. Technical capacity and support to the Southern Sudan Meteorological Agency (SMA) in the Ministry of Transport and Roads (MoTR) has been strengthened through training in agro-meteorology and GIS and the provision of computers and software (e.g. Climsoft), although there is still a need for enhancement in this area (e.g. to contribute to forecasts and climate change assessment and early warnings). Automated Weather Stations (AWS) were provided for 10 states (in addition to five manual weather stations already existing), although one system has yet to be installed; the AWS have not been providing reliable data feeds, with periodic loss of timely data from varied states, based on communications, maintenance and calibration shortfalls that have impact on the effectiveness of the data service and analysis for crop production estimation. Over-reliance on external technical staff within an extended AWS network has proved inefficient and approaches to redress this with locally-trained maintenance have commenced. The pre-MTE purchase of rain gauges appear to have had little impact on the level of data provision and training in the RFE for FSTS staff (June 2011) may be limited by the availability of South Sudan rainfall data. Nevertheless, the data have proved constructive in monitoring seasonal progress against trends and associated with the NDVI data with impact on early warning of poor rainfall performance (prompting RCAs in 2009). FSTS are now regularly generating effective agro-meteorological bulletins that are distributed within line ministries and an expanding range of bodies connected through a large email listing. Bulletins are also produced in hardcopy to overcome the printing capacity at state level.

#### **Output 6: Established food security natural resource information system**

46. Although the natural resource mapping processing was delayed at the date of the MTE, due in part to cost underestimates of imagery acquisition, rapid progress has since been made to develop the suite of geospatial products that will be valuable to monitoring, policy, planning and programming at national and state levels. Training on remote sensing processing techniques and land cover interpretation took place in Florence (IAO) in July 2009 for six staff from five GoSS ministries. The subsequent evaluation of the best ways forward with the FAO NRL team (May 2010), jointly with the SIFSIA-N, resulted in a fast track approach with processing largely conducted from Florence. A ground-truthing programme was implemented capitalising on the earlier training and supported by FSTS/PSU by a series of effective training and validation exercises at state level, led by FSTS (GIS unit), MoAF and PSU staff. Limitations of access and security in states have affected the efficiency of the some of the field validation exercises.

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<sup>26</sup> Southern Sudan Livestock and Fisheries Bulletin Market and Rangeland performance MARF

<sup>27</sup> Guillermo Otanexz (2008) Agricultural Production Estimation Systems - covered crops only and sought to propose methodology improvements for agricultural statistics and sampling

<sup>28</sup> Hutton, Mukhalah, Trant (2011) Plan for Improvements of Agricultural statistics systems March 2011.

47. The geospatial outputs (land cover database and atlas) were completed in draft as at Aug 2011 and the products cut by country, state and by watershed and supplied with a range of other natural resource data layers. Final delivery of the edited land cover map is anticipated in November 2011 and February 2012 for the final outputs of the natural resource atlas. Distribution and promotion of this data appears to have been effective in accessing a wide audience through the major launch with 40 members in line ministries and other stakeholders (August 2011). Data have been distributed to other agencies e.g. WFP, OCHA, UNJLC; there is widespread anticipated utility of the data to act as an entry point to longer-term analysis.

48. It is also envisaged that the land cover database will form the basis for a strategy for agricultural statistics sampling and provide stratification for the country and provide an agricultural areas sample frame for South Sudan (Hutton, Mukhala and Trant 2011<sup>29</sup>) and a potential input to CFSAM, to improve crop area estimates at sub-county level and review of the livelihood characterisations. The high-resolution update provides an effective bridge between datasets collected at national resolutions to those down to county and payam levels. However, the early delays may have affected the ability of the dataset to achieve its full potential within the timescale of the project.

49. On-going utilisation of this land cover and natural resource data will rely on both the human capacity and accessibility of appropriate hardware and software. FSTS and NBS have received appropriate and effective training and infrastructure in GIS and 20 GoSS staff received remote sensing training (2008) and further refresher GIS training was conducted in June 2009. It is recognised that there is “over dependence on few skilled staff on GIS and remote sensing activities”<sup>30</sup>. Although no training post-release of the land cover products has occurred, it is apparent that effective capacity has been built in FSTS, MoAF and MoARF that will enable wider utilisation of the data, but that wider use by other trainees may be more restricted by access to hardware and software.

#### **Output 7: Supported nutrition information system**

50. The SIFSIA work plan envisaged a Nutrition Information System (NIS) to manage the state level records of malnutrition in South Sudan. Despite the lack of progress noted by the MTE, there has not yet been extensive training, specification or development of the planned nutrition database. In part this is because a suitable candidate could not be identified to fill the database post, but also the diminished status of the Nutrition Directorate, downgraded to a Department within the MoH has not helped the standing of nutrition. Efforts to overcome these barriers appear not to have been pursued rigorously and offers of technical assistance from the PSU have not been taken up because of capacity constraints within the MoH. The Nutrition Technical Working Group composed principally of health actors, has met twice within 2011. Database development now appears to have some potential to progress under the auspices of either this group or the Nutrition Cluster, but it still lacks an effective specification and design as envisaged by the SIFSIA project.

51. FAO did mobilise technical support in 2008 to provide training to GoSS partners on dietary diversity score (DDS). The training was conducted with the intention of promoting understanding of nutrition from a food-based perspective and addressing issues of food access. However, the lack of progress in developing a Nutrition Information System and the weak institutional links on nutrition between the health and agricultural sectors relating to nutrition meant that this initiative never achieved its objectives and has been left standing in “thin air”.

52. Despite this situation, two Nutrition Bulletins have been produced by FSTS in November 2010 and June 2011. However, the agriculture contribution and food-based approaches to nutrition has been

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<sup>29</sup> Hutton, Mukhala and Trant (2011) Plan for Improvement of the Agricultural Statistics System (2011)

<sup>30</sup> SIFSIA-South (2011) First half progress report: January- June 2011

under-represented. It is evident that this activity still lacks the strong evidence-base anticipated from the data collation from state levels, effective monitoring criteria, and analytical tools that the proposed NIS might have provided.

#### **Output 8: Research addressing information gaps (at national and decentralised levels)**

53. The research fund was proposed as a component of the fundamental capacity development in food security in public institutions. Six programmes were eventually funded to support understanding of relevance to food security planning and decision-making. They included: (i) Food Insecurity and Nutrition Research in Lainya County; (ii) Gum Acacia Production and Marketing in South Sudan; (iii) Livestock and Fisheries Marketing in Warrap State; (iv) Livestock Marketing for Food Security in South Sudan; (v) the Role of Traditional Agro-forestry in Food Security in South Sudan; and (vi) Research on Traditional Beekeeping.

54. The number of research applications was low and was demand-driven, rather than strategically led. Although the concept of this un-earmarked research fund provided a flexible basis for support to opportunistic research, the MTE recommended a more strategic approach. The PSU also instituted an independent peer review process to provide an evaluation of the research quality.

55. Long research selection periods of over 10 months within the first period and low applications led to a budget underspend; applications within the second period were curtailed, reducing the overall expenditure on this activity. The successfully completed research programmes have been distributed and in some instances, such as the Gum Acacia Production and Marketing study, have apparently had wide national and international distribution and exposure. However, no respondent to this final evaluation cited any of the research action projects as significant outputs of the SIFSIA project.

56. The focus of this fund has been on supporting individual research projects, rather than research capacity building, platform development, environment and infrastructure within appropriate institutions such as universities. It might have been more effective to utilise the fund to develop a research capacity for initiatives to support teams, organisations and develop research networks, which would have provided a longer term potential to support the sound evidence base for decision-making in policy and a more sustainable research capacity.

57. The lack of a strategic approach to the fund, the lack of specific research capacity development within the scope of the project, together with the reduced budget have certainly limited the contribution these research projects have made to food security analysis in South Sudan. Equally, the research project's focus on situation analysis also left opportunities for policy research unanswered.

### **4.3 Gender analysis**

58. Given how important and distinct the respective contributions of women and men are to the agricultural, forestry, livestock and fisheries sectors, there have been real opportunities in SIFSIA-S to incorporate a "gender lens" in the information and analysis of food security that has been undertaken during the second phase of the project. Firstly, the publication of the Food and Nutrition Security Assessment in Sudan (February 2011) which drew upon the National Baseline Household Survey (NBHS) of 2009 should have provided the opportunity to explore gender dimensions, but there is very little disaggregated data other than the finding that the inequality in access to food<sup>31</sup> is slightly higher in female headed than male headed families. Another opportunity was the Review of Selected Sector

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<sup>31</sup> Measured by the coefficient of variation (CV) of the dietary energy consumption (DEC) which is one of the key parameters in the FAO determination of food deprivation

Policies of GoSS to Identify Gaps in Food Security Policy. Gender should have been a key element of this review, but it is not even referenced in the review process, nor the report, another missed opportunity. However, despite this, the Food & Agriculture Policy Framework (FAPF) 2011-2015 has identified the need to “address gender inequality” and it will be important to factor this into subsequent strategies at national and state levels.

59. There is very little information generated through the support of SIFSIA that disaggregates data by gender and therefore there is virtually no gender analysis as such. There is no gender dimension to the CFSAM nor the RCAs (which are principal contributors to the IPC analysis) and the Southern Sudan Nutrition Update produced by the FSTS analyses levels of malnutrition by age, but not by gender<sup>32</sup>.

60. A review of the training conducted with support from SIFSIA shows that only 126 out of 1,095 trainees (11%) were women during the entire project duration. This contrasts with the estimate that women in South Sudan produce between 60 to 80% of the food crops. Unfortunately, this is as much a reflection of how much the GoSS agriculture, forestry, livestock and fisheries technical and extension services are dominated by male personnel, rather than the project discriminating against women trainees. However, it must continue to be the imperative of any future interventions to address this imbalance.

61. GoSS recognises the importance of gender equality. There is a Minister of Gender (Child & Social Welfare) and the government is committed to filling 25% of senior posts with women in accordance with the CPA. The current Minister of Agriculture & Forestry and her predecessor have been women, which have helped considerably to highlight gender concerns; it would also be appropriate to see a better gender balance within the technical assistance teams in future.

#### **4.4 Financial analysis**

**SIFSIA-S Budget Expenditure Table December 2006 to June 2011**

<b>Description</b>	<b>Expenditure to June 2011</b>	<b>Total Budget</b>	<b>Balance</b>	<b>Percentage Disbursed</b>
<b>Food Security Analysis, Policy &amp; Planning</b>				
Output 1: GoSS Framework for Food Security				
- Food Security Technical Secretariat	703,931	1,078,070	341,349	65%
- Food Security in Crisis Analysis	117,056	105,910	-11,146	111%
- Structural Food Security Analysis	50,758	79,958	29,200	63%
- GIS Section	322,972	347,691	24,719	93%
Output 2: GoSS Capacity for FS Policy & Planning				
- Policy & Planning	294,801	386,302	91,501	76%
Sub-total:	1,489,518	1,997,931	508,413	75%
<b>Baseline &amp; Information Systems</b>				
Output 3: Food Security & Livelihood Analysis	606,889	692,453	85,564	88%
Output 4: Crop & Livestock Marketing Information System	484,435	645,276	160,841	75%
Output 5: Crop & Livestock Monitoring & Forecasting	522,889	709,733	186,144	74%
Output 6: Food Security Natural Resources Information	422,088	450,408	28,320	94%

<sup>32</sup> Significant gender issues were also raised by the EU-ROM mission during the course of 2011 which stated that “particular, qualitative information on the role of women in agriculture, food and nutrition security and household resource management should be collected through time and task allocation analyses”



Output 7: Nutrition Information System	151,002	206,055	55,053	73%
Capacity Building for Public Institutions	193,648	199,242	5,594	97%
Sub-total:	2,380,952	2,903,167	522,215	82%
<b>Research, PSU &amp; Support Costs</b>				
Output 8: Food Security Research Fund	229,863	289,167	59,304	79%
Project Support Unit	3,835,677	4,435,902	600,225	86%
Support Costs	555,524	673,833	118,309	
<b>Grand Total:</b>	<b>8,491,532</b>	<b>10,300,000</b>	<b>1,808,468</b>	<b>82%</b>

62. The table above indicates that expenditure against budget<sup>33</sup> is within agreed budget allocations by output. Given that FAO has now requested a two month extension up until 31 January 2012, the total project period will now amount to 62 months; at the time of this financial statement the project duration was 55 months, approximately 88% of the total (revised) project period. By 30 November 2011, TCE estimated total expenditure (excluding field commitments not yet registered on the FAO corporate system) to be approximately €9,927,977 against €10,300,000 with a balance of approximately €370,000.

#### **4.5 Overall conclusions on effectiveness and efficiency**

63. A significant institutional capacity has been built across relevant line ministries and states (nearly 1,100 personnel trained in addition to vehicles and equipment provided) in line with the project objectives. Furthermore, the establishment of the FSTS as a capable, core technical team on food and nutrition security is a significant achievement, but its value will only be sustained post-SIFSIA in conjunction with an operational Food Security Council to which it should report directly.

64. SIFSIA has gained momentum during the second project phase in generating appropriate food and nutrition security outputs, with notable progress in developing the market information system and the land cover survey. The introduction of the IPC through the LAU/LAF has provided a very useful framework to assess food and nutrition security in collaboration with a wide range of actors at state and national levels. However, the basis of the “evidence” and analysis is still quite limited since it relies heavily on seasonal crop assessments, ad hoc nutrition surveys and very limited livelihoods analysis. The communication and dissemination of SIFSIA supported information and analysis outside principal stakeholders lacks the visibility it deserves and is inconsistent.

65. Investments in action research, the GIEWS WS and GeoNetwork were not well conceived and have either not demonstrated much relevance to the strategic objectives of SIFSIA or they have proven inappropriate to serve their intended purpose. There have been other factors which have affected most of the technical outputs (4 to 8), some of which compound on another, for example hardware and software not being available at the time of training which then necessitates refresher training. For convenience of reference, these have been summarised in **Annex 6** to this report.

66. The failure to sufficiently integrate nutrition into the SIFSIA frame is principally because nutrition is still widely perceived as a health issue and there is a lack of understanding of agriculture’s potential contribution. Much needs to be done to raise awareness of this dimension and to better articulate and demonstrate evidence of the inter-dependence of food security and better nutrition.

67. SIFSIA’s contribution to policy development has been opportunistic rather than orchestrated and has not been well served by FAO’s considerable institutional competence in this area.

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<sup>33</sup> The latest certified financial statement accessible to the evaluation was up to 30 June 2011

Opportunities to link the process to strategic planning at state level (across sectors) were missed and both gender and nutrition concerns have been absent from the frame.

## **5 Coverage of SIFSIA**

### **5.1 *National versus state***

68. The SIFSIA project was designed to complement other initiatives such as the Sudan Productive Capacity Recovery Project (SPCRP<sup>34</sup>) and the Support to Agriculture and Forestry Development Project (SAFDP<sup>35</sup>) which both explicitly develop capacity in the agriculture and livestock sectors at state level (across all ten states of South Sudan). Consequently in the first phase, SIFSIA focused on the federal level (now the national level in South Sudan) to strengthen the capacity in GoSS to collect, analyse and disseminate information with policy-makers and decision-makers as the principal target group. However, at the time of the Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) of SIFSIA, it was apparent that due to the late start-up of the SPCR and the SAFDP, the information base at state level which is crucial to make an information system on food and nutrition security (ISFNS) relevant and effective, was very limited and required additional capacity support from SIFSIA. Furthermore, SPCR and SAFDP were never really intended to build capacity to collect and analyse food security information at state level. In the second phase of the project SIFSIA was obliged to re-direct resources to build capacity and support activities at state level to improve the quality of information being generated.

69. Some of the activities at state level were envisaged in the original project. They included the conducting of annual CFSAMs and RCAs, the IPC analysis, the weekly monitoring of crop and livestock market data and the collection of monthly rainfall data. Also through remote sensing, data from 10 Automatic Weather Stations (AWS) is now generated and the condition of rangelands is monitored (with some field verification). The additional elements in phase two have been the identification of focal points (persons) to support the different elements of food security information generated, training of key staff, the provision of office equipment and transport, the quarterly Livelihoods Analysis Forum (LAF) which now rotates from state to state to undertake IPC analysis and improved food security coordination and information sharing at state level. The South Sudan Food Security Update also now provides information and analysis from each of the states and consolidates an overview. It has been a significant achievement over the past three years to build the capacity at state level and to strengthen the linkage between state and national levels through these principal field activities.

### **5.2 *Geographic***

70. SIFSIA has accommodated all ten states of South Sudan in the most recent phase of its capacity-building programme. All states have further identified focal points for IPC and CLiMIS and have been provided with transport means (motorcycles), computers, printers and operating costs by the project to facilitate information collection. Some states (such as Warrap and Unity) were not fully functional in providing food security information for a while, but now the geographic coverage significantly includes all ten states of South Sudan.

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<sup>34</sup> Also (like SIFSIA) financed from Stabex funds through an agreement between the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the European Union (EU)

<sup>35</sup> Financed from the Multi-Donor Trust Funds in the five states not covered by the SPCR

71. The MTE raised the concern that the three “transitional” areas bordering Sudan be accorded special attention in view of their particular vulnerability. The SIFSIA programme was well-placed to capture the impact of secession on food security in the border areas north and south because it embraced the whole of Sudan, in the spirit of the CPA in 2005. The two elements of SIFSIA-N and SIFSIA-S could have collaborated to raise awareness of the issues affecting these areas, but this appears to have been a missed opportunity.

### **5.3 *Vulnerable groups***

72. The assessments upon which SIFSIA relies for assessing food insecurity do not yet generate sufficient information at community or household level to identify vulnerability, and as important, the nature of that vulnerability. The focus of the assessments has principally been on crop production through random surveys. SIFSIA has not paid sufficient attention to the food access dimension of food security, nor has it taken sufficient account of livelihoods based upon agro-pastoralism, pastoralism, fisheries, forestry and other sectors. Furthermore, there is at this stage very little understanding of the factors contributing to malnutrition other than determining the calorie intake with reference to the Minimum Dietary Energy Requirement (MDER). There is also little analysis of social inclusion with respect to age, gender and ethnicity. This is not so much a criticism, since this level of assessment and analysis cannot be achieved within the time-frame of this project, but more to emphasise that this remains a significant gap as the food security information system stands right now.

### **5.4 *Sectoral***

73. At the national level in South Sudan SIFSIA has been particularly effective at bringing together a broad spectrum of line ministries and directorates that play a key role in ensuring food security within the country. These have included the two principal ministries of Agriculture & Forestry and Animal Resources & Fisheries who co-chair the Steering and Technical Committees. Other ministries represented include Health, Transport & Roads, Commerce, Humanitarian Affairs (represented by the SSRRC), Cooperatives & Rural Development (until it was absorbed into MAF) and the National Bureau of Statistics (previously SSCCSE). The Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning and the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare are not sufficiently engaged nor represented which partly explains why the poverty and vulnerability dimensions of SIFSIA’s food security analysis has been very much excluded to date.

74. Furthermore, whilst SIFSIA has recognised the importance of linking food and nutrition security since the outset of the project (one output is a nutrition information system) but this has not materialised (other than through the IPC) principally because malnutrition is still treated more as a health issue than one of food insecurity. Even the Nutrition Updates generated by the FSTS do not feature on the CLiMIS website even though this has become by default the website for SIFSIA-S supported products. However, there is increasingly a commitment across the SIFSIA stakeholders to address this divide.

75. In the absence of a state level Food Security Council, the decentralised Food Security & Livelihoods Clusters have provided the forum for both government and development partners to discuss issues of food and nutrition insecurity within the respective states. These meetings are very inclusive of all interested government and non-government actors across different sectors and provide the opportunity to present information generated through SIFSIA as well as the IPC analysis.

### **5.5 *Development versus humanitarian***

76. Since the information system on food and nutrition security is principally informed by RCAs, CFSAMs and ANLAs, the outputs (including the IPC) tend to assume more of an early warning

function based upon the agricultural seasonal cycles, which typically informs the humanitarian actors. It is a good starting point for the development of a food security information system where capacities at a decentralised level still remain very limited in South Sudan. However, there is still very little understanding in South Sudan of the structural causes of poverty and food and nutrition insecurity, this requires a much longer time-frame building upon exercises such as the Sudan Household Health Survey in 2006 and the National Baseline Household Survey conducted in 2009.

## **6 Relevance and impact**

### **6.1 *Relevance to the food security context, including food security implications of secession***

77. Overall the information and analysis is very relevant to the context post-secession in South Sudan. The country has inherited little in terms of datasets and information systems (most were managed from the north) and there is a considerable absence of information on even the most basic food security indicators at this stage. SIFSIA has done well to identify key sources of information and to develop mechanisms that link the information for broader food and nutrition analysis in South Sudan. The land cover and natural resources mapping provides a good basis for examining trends and acts as a longer term analytical input. Critical for the next stage however is a better understanding of where there are information gaps in the overall analysis and how these can be addressed and contribute to the overall analytical framework (which has yet to be defined).

### **6.2 *Relevance to the overall development priorities of the government***

78. The information system on food and nutrition security, which SIFSIA has supported is beginning to generate information which is of considerable relevance to GoSS in identifying its overall development priorities. However, there was clearly some degree of frustration from the principal donor to SIFSIA that the project's main input to the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) 2011-2013 in March this year was on crop production (based upon the 2010 CFSAM) and very little relating to the status and targets on animal production, animal health and fisheries. This is also where a better understanding of issues affecting households' access to food and other issues affecting poverty would have contributed significantly. Some initial findings from the land cover survey contributed to the baseline information, but the draft datasets and atlas were not launched until July 2011 well after the publication of the SSDP.

### **6.3 *Relevance to the information and policy needs of government ministries***

79. The principal focus of the SIFSIA project has been to build capacity for the generation and analysis of information on food and nutrition security. The information and analysis on agro-meteorological data, crop and livestock marketing, crop and food security assessments, food and nutrition security classification has been well received by decision and policy-makers with a number of examples of how it has been used – see section 6.4 below. It contributes key elements to the overall food security picture and these are foundations upon which future interventions can build. However, the contribution this makes to policy development at this stage is still very limited.

80. The SIFSIA sponsored Review of Selected Sector Policies of the Government of Southern Sudan to Identify Gaps in Food Security Policy (June 2010) was a useful exercise, but its findings and recommendations did not sufficiently address cross-cutting issues especially gender. Furthermore, it has not been widely referenced in the follow up process of developing thematic policies and the broader Food & Agriculture Policy Framework (FAPF) 2011-2015. As yet SIFSIA has not yet contributed to policies on livestock and fisheries at the national level.

81. It might have been much more appropriate for SIFSIA to have worked in closer conjunction with SPCRP on the development of state level strategies for agriculture, forestry, livestock and fisheries as a logical step towards influencing and shaping policy at the national level. This has been a lost opportunity and one where there should have been greater synergy between the two projects.

82. Furthermore, SIFSIA's lack of technical engagement with the development of the National Nutrition Health Policy has been a missed opportunity to factor in agriculture's contribution (through food-based approaches) in the policy, which is very much dominated from a health perspective. SIFSIA did contribute financially to the organisation of the first workshop to initiate the development of the policy, but from thereon the technical support principally came from the FANTA2 project funded by USAID.

#### **6.4 *Extent of utilisation of SIFSIA outputs***

83. Since SIFSIA was designed to provide food security information for better informed policies and decision-making at the federal and/or national level, evidence of the utilisation of SIFSIA generated information and products is really key to measure both the relevance and impact of the project. The more so when one considers that there is not a culture in South Sudan of basing decision-making on evidence (more so on political expediency) because there simply has not been reliable or extensive food security data and analysis available before. The utilisation of information has happened at different levels.

##### **National level**

84. The first significant action recorded was in May 2010, when the Council of Ministers of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) allocated a budget of US\$35 million towards humanitarian assistance (\$35m) and abolished taxation on local and imported staple food commodities. The decision was based upon the assessment of food insecurity within key areas of Southern Sudan and the increase in the cost of crop and livestock products being generated and disseminated by CLiMIS.

85. Also both MAF and MARF were allocated increases in the GoSS budget for 2011 (of 48% and 28% respectively) from 2010 levels; these were based upon the findings of the RCA and CFSAM in 2010, which were formally released at the beginning of 2011. Whilst these represent significant increases within the sector, the MAF and MARF budgets still only represent 1.4% (when combined with Cooperatives and Rural Development) and 0.8% respectively of the GoSS national budget.

86. In an address to the citizens of South Sudan in August 2011, the President of the Republic quoted the findings of the land cover survey which indicate that only about 4% of the land is farmed, and stressed the importance of increasing food production and reducing the country's reliance on aid.

##### **State level**

87. Budget provision to states from the national level covers little more than the cost of core government personnel. Opportunities to generate revenue locally are very limited. However, the evaluation was made aware of the abolition of local taxation on essential food commodities being transported into or within Upper Nile State since the surge in commodity prices during the first eight months of 2011, which have been tracked by CLiMIS. This was widely applied according to local respondents to the evaluation.

88. One international NGO operating in Upper Nile and based in Malakal stated that the crop and livestock market information (generated from different markets within the state) has been very useful

in determining where to buy agricultural commodities locally (such as seeds and tools) and also to determine where supply was not meeting demand and therefore which areas/communities were having most difficulties accessing essential inputs. This was often the best criteria to apply in selecting areas to target interventions.

### **Amongst international agencies**

89. Generally, SIFSIA has low visibility within the international community and the information products generated through SIFSIA support are not that well known at the national level. There has been no clear communications or advocacy strategy. Probably the best avenue for dissemination of information products has been through the Food Security & Livelihoods Cluster operating at national level. However, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for South Sudan confirmed with the evaluation team that seasonal assessments (RCAs and CFSAMs) and the quarterly IPC analysis are key reference points for the UN Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) even though she was not aware that these were facilitated and supported by SIFSIA.

90. The Coordinator of the South Sudan NGO Forum was also unsure how much SIFSIA information products were utilised by NGOs, but this may be in part because the NGOs represented on the Food Security & Livelihoods Cluster are not very active at sharing or disseminating information from this forum.

91. The FSTS has sent out a user survey questionnaire to all e-mail addresses on a list of approximately 300 individuals/organisations to ascertain the relevance and usefulness of the SIFSIA products. Unfortunately the response to date has been very limited (just three) and it has not helped FSTS gain a measure of the utilisation of their information.

## **7 Connectedness**

### ***7.1 Complementarities and synergies with the SPCR and other FSIS***

92. The two Stabex-funded projects **SIFSIA and SPCR** were intended to operate concurrently and complement each other at different levels: federal/national and state levels respectively. SPCR started up later than SIFSIA (the opposite would have been preferable), which meant that SIFSIA was not able to draw upon capacity and information generated at state level until the second phase of the project. However, the linkage has been made to good effect. Positive developments have included: (i) the convening of Joint Steering Committee meetings including SIFSIA, SPCR and SAFDP which have facilitated synergies and coordination across the three projects; and (ii) joint training conducted at state level on computers and data management. Opportunities which were not optimised and could potentially have included SIFSIA engagement were: (i) the MAF/MARF strategic planning process at state level supported by SPCR which could have been a useful starting point for SIFSIA's contribution to food security policies at national level; and (ii) the monthly reporting facilitated by SPCR from MAF/MARF teams at county level to state level, which could have included food security monitoring indicators of use to the FSTS (and SIFSIA).

93. Other areas where SIFSIA has collaborated is with **USAID/FARM** in the area of policy development. Whilst SIFSIA was first engaged in the review of policies relating to food security, USAID/FARM contributed alongside FAO technical assistance (through SIFSIA) to develop the draft Food & Agriculture Policy Framework (FAPF) for South Sudan. USAID/FARM is currently working with the MAF at both national and state levels to generate nine thematic policies which contribute to the overall FAPF. SIFSIA is also engaged with this process.

94. The **Livelihoods Analysis Forum** (LAF) is a long-standing grouping of both government and non-governmental partners that has been instrumental in developing the livelihood zones and associated profiles of South Sudan. LAF has a close technical relationship with the Food Security Technical Secretariat (FSTS) established by SIFSIA. They are both accommodated in the National Bureau of Statistics. The roll-out of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) in the region (notably including South Sudan) has been the principal force bringing LAF and SIFSIA together. LAF provides the institutional “home” in South Sudan for the IPC whilst SIFSIA is able to facilitate and support the training on IPC with technical backstopping from both the EARO in Nairobi and the Global IPC Team. This has proven to be a very effective collaboration and provides useful links through to the NGO community.

95. The **UN World Food Programme** (WFP) and **FEWSNET** are both partners in the global IPC as well as in South Sudan, furthermore they have recognised the importance of working closely with the FSTS and contributing to the capacity building programme of FSTS. Recently WFP has seconded (through the Danish Refugee Council) the post of Food Security Adviser to the FSTS to strengthen its analytical capacity. WFP would like to see its own food security monitoring role better integrated and institutionalised into the FSTS and moving away from the large ANLA exercises to more regular monitoring (at key moments in the agricultural season) focusing on indicators at sentinel sites. Also WFP would hope to see its market monitoring (principally focused on food aid commodities) merged with CLiMIS. FEWSNET is currently undertaking a study of cross-border trade into South Sudan, a dimension of food security which SIFSIA has yet to take into account. These are significant developments that could be the catalyst to further technical partnerships with the FSTS and the potential for more effective food security networking.

96. Finally, it is important to stress the role of the **Food Security & Livelihoods Cluster** (chaired by FAO) in linking SIFSIA information and analysis to the broader humanitarian community including NGOs. This operates at both the national and state levels. At state level it is the principal mechanism through which food and nutrition security issues are discussed and assessed.

## **8 Sustainability**

### ***8.1 Prospects for sustainability when SIFSIA ends***

97. Whilst phase one of the SIFSIA project was categorised as the “preparatory” stage, the second phase of the project was anticipated to be a period when institutional capacities developed within GoSS, particularly the FSC, the Technical Committee and the FSTS assume more of a pro-active role with reduced reliance upon the management and technical capacity of the PSU. In December 2009, the chair of the SIFSIA-S Steering Committee first requested that the “PSU should come up with a clear sustainability road map for post-SIFSIA food security information system activities, with clearly spelt out institutional roles, strategies and responsibilities for managing the established systems as well as explore alternatives ones”.

98. The CTA of SIFSIA presented the SIFSIA-S “Programme Phase-out Strategy” at the Technical Committee of June 2011 some eighteen months later. The strategy outlines the principles and approaches employed by SIFSIA to ensure long-term sustainability which include: (i) building on existing structures in GoSS and the states; (ii) cyclical and phased human resource capacity-building; (iii) training a critical mass of staff to ensure continuity and an institutional memory; (iv) coaching and mentoring on-the-job; and (v) combining human resource capacity building with physical and financial support.

99. Key elements of the phase-out strategy are: (i) strong government ownership of the project (including the governance structures, the focus on state level and government staff now running the CLiMIS secretariat and the Livelihoods Analysis Forum); (ii) collaboration with technical partners such as WFP, FEWSNET and the USAID/FARM project; (iii) absorption of staff on to the government payroll (including MARF, SSRRC, MoTR and NBS<sup>36</sup>); (iv) documenting procedures for data collection and analysis; and (v) lobbying interested donors for future project financing. Indeed, it is the view of the evaluation that the PSU/SIFSIA-S has made significant achievements in building these institutional capacities and linkages within its means and control.

100. However, the phase-out strategy falls short of outlining explicit exit arrangements that have to be put in place to ensure that GoSS covers the operating costs of the most critical activities (Food Security Reporting, IPC, CLiMIS, Livestock and Agromet Bulletins) to ensure continued information collection, analysis and dissemination at both state and national level. These are principally the operating costs which to date have been covered through the Letters of Agreement (LoAs) at state level and with principal stakeholders (MAF, MARF, NBS, MoH, MoTR and SSRRC). Now critically, work plans need to be developed with the FSTS, the CLiMIS Secretariat and the SSMA beyond 31 January 2012 (the envisaged end date of the project after a no-cost extension of two months) in the absence of any other external funding in the foreseeable future.

101. A real concern to the evaluation at national level is the relative absence of the Food Security Council; there is no group representing multi-sectoral interests in food and nutrition security to build on the project gains and continue the mantle of SIFSIA. It is not appropriate for either MAF or MARF to assume this role as has been demonstrated from the experience with SIFSIA-N where one sector can potentially hijack the agenda. The FSTS currently provides the “bridge” across the sectors in terms of technical analysis, but its capacity has been undermined in the past from high levels of staff turnover (especially at the level of National Coordinator); and staff morale and the future of the FSTS depends very much on the appointment of the Secretary General and the functioning of the Food Security Council.

102. Another concern to the evaluation is that GoSS resources at state level will not be sufficient to sustain even the most fundamental activities of information collection and dissemination. Furthermore, the implications of splitting of the two ministries at state level (MAF and MARF) are that one partner (often MARF) no longer has access to the transport and equipment provided through SIFSIA.

103. The new Food Security Policy and Strategy Capacity Building Programme, which it is hoped will be funded by a number of donors (including the EU, Spain and CIDA), was formulated earlier this year. Spain has already committed funding to this initiative through FAO, but other donors are unlikely to commit until later in 2012. The programme will provide resources for technical assistance at both national and state levels, but government will be expected to sustain the payroll of the national FSTS staff and integrate programme activities into state level budgets. Consequently, it should sustain the level of technical support that has previously been provided by the PSU/SIFSIA-S and integrate it more effectively to the FSTS and the Food Security Council. The programme is designed to support six states of South Sudan: Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal and Warrap (EU); Jonglei and Upper Nile (CIDA); and Lakes (Spain). Support to the other four states in South Sudan (the three Equatorias and Unity) is not clear and this raises issues of future sustainability especially in Unity state which is not linked to other project initiatives in food security<sup>37</sup>.

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<sup>36</sup> the most critical of these were the staff costs of the FSTS which have now been absorbed into the 2012 budget of the National Bureau of Statistics (GoSS) and recorded as such in the minutes of the Technical Committee (June 2011)

<sup>37</sup> Central, Eastern and Western Equatoria are supported through the USAID/FARM project



## **9 Management and reporting**

### **9.1 *Overview of management arrangements***

104. The MTE recognised that communications between the principal stakeholders, the GoSS, the EC Delegation and FAO (including both SIFSIA and SPCRP) were not sufficient to support and guide the project(s) during phase one and so it was recommended that meetings between the chair of the Steering Committee, the EC and FAO be convened on a quarterly basis. This has not happened and misunderstandings about the effectiveness and impact of the project still prevail. The donor in particular has understandable concerns about the reduction in technical assistance accorded to the project at a time when the team should be focused on delivering an agreed exit strategy prior to the project end. The GoSS had the impression that SIFSIA was “running out of steam” unaware perhaps of the role and responsibilities that government should now be assuming. FAO has been more focused on the next project formulation than considering their management responsibilities during the phasing out of SIFSIA. Insufficient commitment has been made by all stakeholders to conduct these tripartite meetings and it is the view of the evaluation that this has been detrimental to the oversight of the project.

### **9.2 *Food Security Council and the Food Security Technical Secretariat***

105. The relative absence of a functional Food Security Council (despite its establishment by Presidential Decree in 2008) and the appointment of a Secretary General has meant that SIFSIA (and other food security initiatives) have not been “headed” at a strategic level in GoSS representing the multi-sectoral nature of the initiative. It also has left the Food Security Technical Secretariat (FSTS) more dependent upon the (temporary) Project Support Unit (PSU) for guidance and mentoring at this stage of the project than would have been the case had it been reporting to the Secretary General of the FSC as focal point and instigator. At least two FSTS Coordinators have departed since the start of the project (the post now has an Acting Coordinator for the past six months), which has also affected the morale within the technical team. Overall, however the evaluation was particularly impressed with the commitment of an enthusiastic and skilled team within the Secretariat and the close technical working collaboration they have developed with the Database Unit in MAF and the Resource Centre in MARF (constituting the CLiMIS Secretariat). This technical team is “core” to the future sustainability of the gains achieved by SIFSIA over the past five years and must not be compromised beyond the end of the project.

### **9.3 *Project Steering Committee and Technical Committee***

106. The SIFSIA-S Steering Committee convenes annually (in December) to approve the programme work plans and budgets. It is chaired on a rotational basis either by the Minister of Agriculture & Forestry (MAF) or the Minister of Animal Resources & Fisheries (MARF). It should provide more of an oversight function than the one annual meeting allows. The more regular business of the SIFSIA programme is debated within the Technical Committee, which typically meets three times annually (as is the case in 2011). The chair of the Technical Committee also rotates between the two ministries and is chaired at the level of Undersecretary (although in reality this is often delegated to the Director General). On occasions it appropriately convenes to cover three projects: SIFSIA, SPCRP and the Support to Agriculture & Forestry Development Project (SAFDP) funded through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) in the five non-SPCRP states; all three interventions are very complementary to each other. In fulfilling a coordination function, it operates well. Representation across the principal line ministries (MAF, MARF, NBS, MoH and SSRRC) is good, and now includes the Ministry of Water Resources & Irrigation, the Ministry of Transport and Roads and the Ministry of Commerce. However, as noted earlier, the two ministries regularly absent from the fold (the Ministry

of Finance & Economic Planning and the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare) would better represent issues of poverty and social exclusion.

107. This structure works well in the absence of a functioning Food Security Council. Once the Food Security Council becomes functional (and there is no longer need for oversight of the SIFSIA project) then the Steering Committee should effectively become redundant and more senior representation could be accorded to the Technical Committee, which does well to service inter-project collaboration and coordination at a practical level.

#### **9.4     *Within FAO***

108. SIFSIA-S has been well served by the Project Task Force in FAO Rome as well as the management and operational support from the Emergency Operations and Rehabilitation Division (TCE) in FAO, Rome. The technical backstopping of the project from the Agricultural Development Economics Division (ESA), the Statistics Division (ESS) and the Land & Water Division (NRL) has been very consistent. There is notably limited support from the Sub-Regional Office in Addis Ababa where technical support has been decentralised within FAO in support of the Horn of Africa region (there should be opportunities here for SIFSIA-S to have drawn on institutional policy capacity as well as through TCS at headquarters level). However, the Regional Emergency Office for Africa (REOA) has been particularly engaged in the IPC roll-out (of which South Sudan is one of the principal countries). The one area of weakness has been in terms of technical support for nutrition requirements and assessments, which reflects capacity constraints both at headquarters and sub-regional level to effectively support this dimension of food security.

109. The working relationship between the PSU/SIFSIA and the FAO Office for South Sudan in Juba appears to work very effectively, especially since the FAO Office in Juba has gained some degree of autonomy. SIFSIA shares procurement and financial management functions with the SPCR and FAO Office. FAO has also encouraged close collaboration between the Emergency & Rehabilitation Coordination Unit (ERCU) for South Sudan and the project with respect to the IPC and the recent fisheries and livestock surveys (the latter being funded by the ERCU).

#### **9.5     *The Project Support Unit***

110. The Project Support Unit (PSU) for SIFSIA-S based in Juba is responsible for (i) the preparation of work plans and progress reports; (ii) the provision of technical assistance and backstopping; (iii) the management of Letters of Agreements (LoAs) with principal stakeholders; and (iv) the training of staff in the FSTS. The PSU includes a Chief Technical Adviser (international), an Information Systems & Capacity Building Specialist (international), a Food Security Analyst (international), a Programme Manager (national) and two additional Food Security Analysts (nationals) plus support staff. The PSU has functioned well and has close technical collaboration with the FSTS despite concerns during the MTE that they were physically located well apart.

111. With effect from July 2011, the CTA and one Food Security Analyst (national) left to join another project in South Sudan being managed by FAO and financed by CIDA. These two staff have not been replaced by FAO despite the importance of developing a coherent exit strategy, ensuring that outstanding commitments are met in the last six months of the project and managing the phase out process. The Information Systems & Capacity Building Specialist has instead become the Acting CTA in effect fulfilling two jobs. Inevitably, the project has lost profile and leadership through the departure of the CTA, and there is an additional burden on the PSU team remaining, which FAO should have addressed. The EC Delegation have now insisted that the international CTA post be filled by a consultant (for just two months) prior to approving the no-cost extension to the project (until the end of January 2012). It is not clear to the evaluation what this will realistically achieve at this late

stage, but it is indicative of how a closer working relationship between the donor and FAO could have addressed the issue more effectively at the time.

## **9.6 Reporting**

112. SIFSIA partners receiving funding from the project through Letters of Agreement (LoA) report quarterly to the PSU. Since the second phase of the project, this now includes the ten states of South Sudan. The PSU in turn, now reports every six months against the eight specific project outputs. The format for reporting has improved considerably since phase one of the project, but it still remains more process orientated than outcome orientated because of the design of the log-frame. Therefore the reporting format still has significant limitations with respect to recording “impact” of the project and in particular changes in the food and nutrition security according to the principal impact indicators.

## **10 Lessons learned**

### **10.1 For supporting ISFNS and policy-making in South Sudan**

113. There are few examples in Africa (and beyond) of information systems for food and nutrition security (ISFNS) which have been integrated into emerging government institutions at a time when policy frameworks are very much in evolution. South Sudan provides a real opportunity to learn from the experience of SIFSIA over the past five years.

#### **The concept and design**

114. SIFSIA was well conceived and the formulation process included key players from within the country (as well as technical experience from outside). It has proven to be very flexible in its support of different institutional capacities across sectors and at different levels. However, the project was too ambitious in scope, both temporally and spatially, to ever achieve its objectives in South Sudan. In particular, it did not take into account: (i) the total lack of capacity and information being generated at the field level where the dimension of poverty monitoring was always going to be a particular challenge in a context where baselines barely exist; and (ii) the different skills set required to develop a (technical) food security information system and to integrate this information into the (political) processes of policy and decision-making.

115. Resources and capacities accorded to SIFSIA were insufficient to achieve the full scope of the project. It was only possible to concentrate on developing some key elements of the information system on food and nutrition security and be creative in linking up with other initiatives such as the SPCR/SAFDP, CFSAM, WFP/ANLA, LAF/IPC and USAID/FARM to draw on complementary resources and expertise.

116. Nutrition is an important dimension of food security (and food security a key element of better nutrition), yet was not sufficiently included in the original project design and remained an “add-on” as a separate output, never becoming integrated within the project framework (further aggravated by GoSS institutional arrangements for nutrition within the Ministry of Health).

Building up a credible and sustainable information system on food and nutrition security requires a much longer time frame than five years in a post-conflict context such as South Sudan.

## **The context**

117. During 2007-2011 huge demands have been placed upon GoSS with respect to ensuring security, conducting the census, elections, a referendum on secession, as well as achieving national independence. The expectations that GoSS would accord priority to establishing a functioning Food Security Council (FSC) and appoint a Secretary General, were probably unrealistic prior to independence, especially when SIFSIA already had operating Steering and Technical Committees. There were many other national priorities competing for scarce GoSS human and financial resources and yet government revenue was barely able to cover the public service payroll during this period.

## **The understanding**

118. There has been insufficient understanding across stakeholders of SIFSIA's food security analytical framework and how different elements of the project contribute to a better understanding of food and nutrition security in South Sudan. Food and nutrition security in South Sudan is not just about crop production, but because of insufficient resources and capacity, SIFSIA-S became more focused on this than other areas. There is an urgent need to articulate a "roadmap" based upon a food security conceptual framework which links the elements of Agro-met data, CLiMIS, the land cover survey, GAM/SAM rates, poverty and vulnerability, livestock and fishery surveys etc., and demonstrates how each contributes to the overall analysis at different levels. This would particularly benefit technical departments within GoSS concerned with early warning, nutrition, gender, social protection and poverty (which are as yet not yet sufficiently engaged) and promote better inter-sectoral collaboration across principal GoSS line ministries (MAF, MARF and MoH) to address common issues that affect food and nutrition insecurity in different contexts of the country.

## **Capacity Building**

119. Resources attributed to capacity building must contribute to achieving the project objectives. Capacity building has to be based upon a comprehensive needs assessment of functions within the institutions being supported, which directly relate to the activities and outputs of the project. Training must be tailored and targeted to strengthen the skills set of individuals to achieve those functions. As far as possible, this training should ideally be on-the-job and cyclical rather than pursuing academic qualifications "overseas".

120. Furthermore, there is a need to provide effective follow-up to training to consolidate the lessons through on the job activity and support, especially in technical subjects. This may best be achieved through Training of Trainers to provide local support or through on-line mechanisms and the development of a community of users, rather than isolated training missions.

121. Low numbers of female technical and management staff are employed in the agriculture, livestock and fisheries sectors so the gender equity of the capacity building programme was very disproportionate in favour of men.

122. There were very high attrition rates of staff after training and the large majority of trainees are no longer associated directly with activities or outputs relating to the project (even though they may be contributing to the food and nutrition sectors elsewhere). For many staff the training provided a means to pursue other opportunities and careers, which might not have been the case had the training been better adapted to the posts to which they were assigned. Future interventions should adopt a more targeted approach to capacity building linked to a longer term commitment from staff to the post or assignment for which they are trained.

## **Implementation**

123. Project outputs which are built upon existing initiatives or systems operating in similar contexts such as the Crop and Livestock Marketing Information System (CLiMIS) tend to prove the most relevant and effective provided they do not just strengthen sectoral biases.

124. Collaboration with other technical agencies (such as WFP/VAM and FEWSNET) through the FSTS has helped generate an effective, informal network of food security actors which could expand with the FSTS as its “core”. It could develop organically rather like the Kenya Food Security Group (KFSG) whilst the Food Security & Livelihoods Cluster represents the broader KFS Meeting.

125. Information products generated with SIFSIA support (principally through the FSTS) are not easily accessed and consequently not well known although they are posted on two websites (FAO/SIFSIA and CLiMIS). SIFSIA would have informed humanitarian and development actors better (and consequently been more influential) if it had developed a communications strategy to optimise the dissemination and utilisation of information and adopted a single information portal.

126. Not all tools anticipated at the time of project formulation were appropriate to context (GIEWS work station and GeoNetwork) and should have been subject to much more rigorous feasibility studies.

### ***10.2 Generically, for supporting food security “post-conflict” in challenging contexts***

127. Governments will determine their own agenda and are often reluctant or unable to commit to institutional arrangements outlined in project agreements when they have other over-riding priorities and limited resources to deliver; it is better to build upon existing capacities where possible and for the project to be flexible to adapt to new opportunities that meet the project objectives rather than to be limited to a prescriptive approach.

128. The food and agriculture sector will compete with other government priorities post-conflict and is unlikely to be accorded funding beyond establishing core staff functions with reduced resources at decentralised levels; it is therefore important that projects such as SIFSIA play a strong advocacy role in generating not only government resources, but also external (donor) support to address both acute and chronic food and nutrition insecurity.

129. Livelihoods analysis is simply not achievable in a five year time-frame if the project has to build skills and capacity from very basic levels and the resources are not available to generate information at the field level. Projects should take into account capacities outside government including NGOs and civil society organisations which could complement government services and are often better placed to deliver field information and enhance coverage over a longer time-frame.

## **11 Recommendations**

### ***11.1 For the remainder of the SIFSIA project***

1. Tripartite meetings to be held monthly between the chair of the SIFSIA (and SPCRP) Steering Committee, the FAOR, the EU (and other donors committed to future funding of information systems on food and nutrition security and policy-making) during this critical period of project phase-out and the introduction of new food security intervention (*Responsibility of the SIFSIA Steering Committee Chair*).

2. A review of the provisions of Spanish funding (agreed 25 November 2011) to determine what project costs relating to technical assistance at different levels can be sustained at the national level until EU and CIDA funding becomes effective (*Responsibility of FAO with Spanish Government*).
3. An exit strategy to be finalised for presentation by the PSU to the Technical and Steering Committees in December 2011 identifying the operating costs of each component to be borne by GoSS effective from 1 February 2012 to ensure that the gains achieved through SIFSIA are not lost. Work plans to be developed with the FSTS, LAF, the CLiMIS secretariat, SSMA, the four working groups and the state level SIFSIA focal points for 2012 (*Responsibility of FAO/PSU with GoSS*).
4. The Food & Agriculture Policy Framework (FAPF) 2011-2015 should be finalised prior to project completion (*Responsibility of MAF/GoSS with technical support of PSU*).
5. The Food Security Council should be activated and consideration given to renaming it the Food and Nutrition Security Council because food security and nutrition security are intrinsically linked and both require a multi-sectoral approach; a Secretary General must be appointed before the start-up of the new South Sudan Food Security Policy and Strategy Capacity Building Programme<sup>38</sup> (*Responsibility of GoSS*).

### ***11.2 For the South Sudan Food Security Policy and Strategy Capacity Building Programme***

6. FAO must make a concerted effort to recruit a strong and committed technical team for the new project by adopting a more direct recruitment strategy (head-hunting, use of recruitment agencies, advertising within the East Africa Region) for identifying suitably motivated individuals with the requisite skills and experience (*Responsibility of FAO*).
7. The project should start up with minimal delay and should prioritise states with highest chronic food and nutrition insecurity and particular attention should also be accorded to areas bordering Sudan which are especially vulnerable to issues of food security exacerbated by the secession of South Sudan from the north (*Responsibility of GoSS/FAO/donors*).
8. The Food (and Nutrition) Security Council should meet on a six monthly basis (except where meetings to review special and urgent circumstances are convened) and assume overall coordination and monitoring of the all food and nutrition security interventions. Linkages between the F(N)SC at national level and any future functioning state level F(N)SC need to be defined. The Food (and Nutrition) Security Technical Secretariat (F(N)STS) should have direct reporting lines to the Secretary General of the FS(N)C. The Technical Committee (encompassing SIFSIA, SPCR and SAFDP) should continue to meet on a quarterly basis and brief the FS(N)C as it previously briefed the Steering Committee (*Responsibility of GoSS*).
9. The project should collaborate with other initiatives to develop an early warning capacity within the SSRRC/MHA for more effective disaster preparedness and risk management<sup>39</sup> and support (particularly IT training follow-up through remote, on-line tools) should continue to be provided

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<sup>38</sup> Currently the new Food Security Policy & Strategy Capacity Building Programme formulation envisages the Food Security Council to be operational 6 to 12 months into the programme: it should be a pre-condition of the programme start-up

<sup>39</sup> The UN Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator to South Sudan indicated to the evaluation that UNICEF has been requested to initiate the development of this capacity within SSRRC/MHA

to statistical units within MAF, MARF, the Nutrition Division of MoH, which are essential and important technical links to the F(N)STS<sup>40</sup> (*Responsibility of GoSS/FAO/donors*)

10. The South Sudan Meteorological Office functions require review to determine future capacity and service provision (beyond just aviation) and the line of communication through to the F(N)STS (*Responsibility of GoSS*).
11. A Food & Nutrition Security Analytical Framework (FNSAF) for South Sudan should be developed through a consultative process with principal stakeholders to articulate the contribution of different elements of information to different stages of analysis (it should be illustrated on a wall chart) and an information flow diagram should be developed to supplement the FNSAF. The FNSAF should identify current gaps in data/analysis and also other sources of information that could contribute to the system<sup>41</sup> (*Responsibility of F(N)STS with PSU technical support*).
12. The profile of nutrition and gender concerns within the food security agenda must be raised significantly and incorporated into any future information systems and analysis. Technical expertise in (food-based) nutrition and gender must be factored into the project both at state level and more strategically at the national policy level. It is highly recommended that international technical assistance be attached to the F(N)SC for 24 months (*Responsibility of GoSS/FAO/donors*).
13. The element of policy development has to be addressed more strategically (especially in a new political context such as South Sudan) and should be better supported institutionally by FAO through technical assistance with the appropriate skills set. An international policy expert attached to the F(N)STS should facilitate a more strategic approach (drawing more effectively on FAO's institutional capacity) with the inclusion of livestock production and animal health as much as crop production within the policy frame. Cross-cutting issues including climate change, environment, gender and social exclusion as well as nutrition concerns must be more effectively incorporated (*Responsibility of GoSS with support from FAO*).
14. The F(N)STS should work with LAF to review the livelihood zones (with reference to the land cover data set) and update the livelihood profiles in South Sudan; the information base at state level should include more rigorous analysis of household food and nutrition insecurity taking into account the different livelihood zones (*Responsibility of F(N)STS with support from FAO*).
15. A communications strategy must be developed to considerably enhance the visibility of the intervention, the effective dissemination of information and analysis generated, as well as electronic access to these products. As part of this strategy, the CLiMIS website should be adopted as the portal for the F(N)STS and renamed accordingly (*Responsibility of F(N)STS with support from FAO*).
16. CLiMIS should be expanded to include data from key markets outside state capitals and potentially linked with other sub-regional initiatives such as Food Net (*Responsibility of F(N)STS with support from FAO*).

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<sup>40</sup> This is not explicit within the project formulation document (August 2011)

<sup>41</sup> for example the study currently being conducted by FEWSNET on cross-border trade and WFP's market survey of food aid commodities

17. Capacity building at both national and state levels must be more strategic; it should focus on key functions within line ministries and the F(N)STS which contribute directly to the project outputs/outcomes; training must be tailored to deliver on the specific skills set required and as far as possible should be cyclical, on-the-job and supported through training of trainers and regular follow-up. Staff trained should indicate their commitment to the post for at least a period of three years (*Responsibility of GoSS with FAO support*).

### ***11.3 Any generic recommendations***

18. Information systems depend entirely upon the quality of data generated from the field and so the focus of attention must initially be directed towards effective functional specification and building capacity at this level first and work incrementally upwards. Data quality assessments should be built into the information workflow to provide confidence in the products produced or at least information of explicit known knowledge.
19. Information systems in post-conflict environments require long-term investment if they are to become relevant, effective and sustainable. Consistent and regular funding to support systems that are well institutionalised across a network of actors (both governmental and non-governmental) will have a greater impact than short cycle injections of resources and capital.



## Annex 1 Terms of Reference

Food and Agriculture Organization of the  
United Nations



**Office of Evaluation**  
**October 2011**

***"Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Security Information for Action"***  
***(SIFSIA) 2007-2011***

***Terms of Reference for the Project Final Evaluation***

### **1. Background**

1.1 The SIFSIA project is to be seen within the framework of the overall objective or development goal of the European Commission's development assistance to the Sudan that is consolidated peace with sustainable and equitable development. The EC assistance is based on a multi-track response strategy involving the design of interventions for different timeframes (immediate, medium and long-term) and for different geographic/administrative levels. Among the different initiatives foreseen under the 'Institutional Capacity' chapter of the Framework of Mutual Obligations (FMO), SIFSIA is expected to contribute to food security by supporting the strengthening of policy and planning initiatives and of food security and market information systems.

1.2 SIFSIA is a five-year project<sup>42</sup> that aims to contribute to food security by supporting policy and planning initiatives on the basis of enhanced information systems. It is a national initiative, and the full implementation of SIFSIA has been entrusted to FAO. Given the different food security situations and related needs and institutional and policy frameworks that existed from the time of the design, the SIFSIA programme has been divided into two sub-programmes: one for the North and one for the South. Both sub-projects have similar objectives and activities, and each one has its own budget and separate implementation arrangements. These ToRs are therefore common for two similar evaluations to be conducted in parallel, for each of the sub-projects. This also reflects one of the basic tenets of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed by the GoS and the SPLM on 9<sup>th</sup> of January 2005 that is the *One Country- Two Systems* principle. This is reinforced by the latest political context in the Sudan that the referendum in early 2011 has resulted in the succession of the South from the North by July 2011. Given the context, the final evaluation will be done in the context of two complementary projects funded by the EU in two neighbouring countries.

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<sup>42</sup> Initially the project was of a four year duration. In June 2010, a no cost extension and budget revision was approved, extending the project for 12 months.

1.3 SIFSIA was signed by the Government of Sudan (National Authorising Officer, NAO), EC and FAO on 5 October 2006. In accordance with the Contribution Agreement (CA) and the first amendment to the CA, the implementation of the project commenced on 1 December 2006<sup>43</sup>, and the revised end date of the project is 30 November 2011. A mid-term evaluation was undertaken between October-November 2009 and lessons drawn and recommendations for the second phase of the project provided (see summary, Annex 1). A final evaluation was foreseen in the project document to take place in order to review the programme implementation following the OECD DAC criteria and recommendations on the future of food security information in the Sudan, and the adequate transfer from SIFSIA management functions to the Sudanese institutions.

1.4 The external funding of SIFSIA amounts to EUR 20.6 million, of which EUR 20 million is financed by the European Commission (Stabex funds). The funding is equally divided between North and South. In addition, the project foresaw substantial contributions (in kind) by the Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan.

1.5 The overall objective of SIFSIA is to assist the respective national authorities to build up necessary institutional and human capacity to be able to address the current disconnect between policy, programming and planning on one hand, and food security information and analysis on the other. Establishment of internal capacity to collect and process information to enable national authorities to ensure a comprehensive and relevant set of responses for addressing food insecurity in a sustainable manner is key to the project strategy. This in turn will contribute to the achievement of MDG#1, reduced poverty and hunger. As described in the project document, key desired results of SIFSIA should include: human, physical and organisational capacities strengthened in the generation and utilisation of information for the analysis, design, monitoring and evaluation of food security related policies and programmes. SIFSIA objectives are:

- Overall policy framework for food security defined and operational.
- Institutional set-up for food security established and functioning to enhance coordination and strengthen vertical and horizontal linkages.
- Effective policies and programmes designed, monitored, evaluated and updated for: (i) rehabilitation and strengthening smallholders' livelihoods; (ii) managing natural resources in a sustainable and equitable manner; (iii) protecting the vulnerable; and (iv) monitoring relevant MDG and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper indicators.
- Relevant food security information easily accessed and used by all relevant stakeholders.

1.6 The project foresaw the revision of the SIFSIA logical framework through a participatory exercise (Annex 2). This took place in September 2008 for South Sudan sub-programme, and October 2008 for North Sudan sub-programme. The revised comprehensive logframe took into account the views of major stakeholders and the specific context in the Sudan (both North and South). The exercise also supported the development of a monitoring and evaluation framework (performance measurement plan) as well as recommend template/formats for performance reporting.

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<sup>43</sup> Programme activities started de facto with arrival of international staff (March 2007 in North Sudan and May 2007 in South Sudan)

1.7 The Mid Term Evaluation assessed project performance at midpoint and made specific recommendations for the duration of the project. The main conclusions and recommendations are annexed to the TOR.

## **2. Purpose of the Evaluation**

2.1 The overall purpose of this final evaluation is to review project delivery of the expected outputs and provide decision makers in the Governments (GNU and GoSS), and the European Commission with sufficient information to make an informed judgement about the performance of the project (its relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and impact), make decisions about future related interventions and the future of food security information in North and South Sudan, acknowledging the recent division into two separate States.

2.2 In addition, the evaluation is an opportunity to learn from this experience in order to improve the design and implementation of similar interventions in the future that aim to improve food security information systems in countries, in the use at national level of the food security information systems and how these in turn contribute to improved decision-making. For this reason, it is expected that the evaluation findings will lead to conclusions and recommendations useful for future normative, operational and organization strategies for information systems for food and nutrition security<sup>44</sup>.

## **3. Scope of the Evaluation**

3.1 The final evaluation will evaluate FAO's performance during the project throughout all phases from formulation to handover but with a particular focus on results since the mid-term evaluation. This evaluation, will have as a reference point the original project log frames but will base itself on the revised log frame.

3.2. The independent evaluation will assess the overall results of the programme and analyze them against the OECD/DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability. The evaluation should be seen as being both evaluative and formative.

3.3 For the purposes of the evaluation, the definition of **food security** used is that promoted by FAO as originally defined at the World Food Summit 1996 and framed within a multisectoral causal model that identifies food availability, access, utilization and stability as underlying domains related to food security. *"Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life."*

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<sup>44</sup> FAO currently has a draft corporate strategy on Information Systems for Food and Nutrition Security/ISFNS under development.

3.4 The evaluation defines an **information system for food and nutrition security** as: *"a group of interrelated activities typically including data generation, data cleaning and processing, data analysis, data storage and retrieval, and communication and dissemination, which are brought together as a whole."* Common functions of such a system are baseline vulnerability and poverty assessments, early warning, needs assessments, programme monitoring and impact evaluation.<sup>i</sup> The SIFSIA project provides inputs to specific parts of this system and on several levels: providing normative and technical support in the form of tools, methods, standards; engaging in capacity building of individuals and institutions; and supporting the analytical linkages between FSN information and analysis and decision/policy making in the form of research, policy analysis and advice. The results indicators of interest to the evaluation will be related to the utilization of the generated FSN information and analysis (outcomes) by both public<sup>45</sup> and private sector actors - and the extent to which programmes and policies have been influenced and improved by such inputs (impact) in terms of resource allocations, increased visibility of food security within high level strategic frameworks and policies, institutional capacity developed, and increased inter-sectoral collaboration in tackling food insecurity and malnutrition. The longer term development goal of improved food security at population level is considered relevant to programme but measurement and the assessment of the SIFSIA programmes' contribution to any changes in goal level indicators is likely to be problematic given the relatively short timeframe of the project and plethora of other factors that also have influence on these development indicators.

3.5 Audience and potential users of the evaluation include mainly governmental authorities in both North (GNU) and South Sudan (GoSS) and the European Commission as well as FAO management and programme staff at country level as well as relevant FAO technical and management staff at Headquarters. The final evaluation will address specific issues in relation to the Organization's functional relationships with: (i) the GNU and GoSS; (ii) the different ministries (Agriculture & Forestry, International Cooperation, Finance & National Economy, Animal Resources & Fisheries, Irrigation, Social Welfare, and Health) in both North (GNU) and South (GoSS); (iii) other relevant institutions such as the Sudan Meteorological Authority (SMA), the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC), Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC), the South Sudan Commission for Census, Statistics and Evaluation, (iv) the European Union and (v) other food security information user stakeholders including UN agencies, donors and non-government organizations.

#### **4. Key issues/key evaluation questions**

4.1. The evaluation analysis will be developed around the OECD criteria as presented below, and will build on the work carried out in the Mid-Term evaluation and the key conclusions of previous evaluations<sup>46</sup>. An initial list of key sub questions has been identified through discussions with project stakeholders. The evaluation team may identify other issues in the course of evaluation.

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<sup>45</sup> Including GoNU and GoSS and resource partners (development and humanitarian)

<sup>46</sup> SIFSIA Mid Term Evaluation, the global evaluation of FAO and WFPs Work in ISFNS, as well as the 2004-2009 Sudan Country Evaluation

## **4.2 Relevance**

- a) Relevance and coherence of the SIFSIA programme to development priorities and needs. This includes the development of priorities and needs of both Governments (GNU and GoSS). Special attention will be given to the rapidly changing context in Sudan including the relevance of the current institutional set up for the future given the succession of South Sudan during 2011.
- b) Clarity and realism of each of the sub-programme's development and immediate objectives, including specification of targets and identification of institutional beneficiaries and prospects for sustainability.(the mission will examine in greater detail the revised project logframe which has been the basis for project implementation since late 2008).
- c) Quality, clarity and adequacy of each of the sub-programme design and implementation including:
  - clarity and logical consistency between, inputs, activities, outputs and final achievement of objectives (quality, quantity and time-frame); appropriateness of the designed coverage of the project (national, state)
  - realism and clarity in the specification of prior obligations and prerequisites (assumptions and risks) and adequacy of resources (time, funding, human resources) for the successful implementation of the project;
  - clarity of external institutional relationships, and in the managerial and institutional framework for implementation and the work plan;
  - likely cost-effectiveness of the programme design;
  - adequacy and appropriateness of the technical solutions proposed (level of sophistication of systems, equipments, proposed institutional set-up, etc) with respect to the existing (or expected) capacities in both GNU and GoSS institutions expected to take over them.

## **4.3 Efficiency**

- d) Efficiency and adequacy of programme implementation including: solutions proposed; use of resources; timely and cost effective start up of the project; the quality and timeliness of input delivery by both FAO and the Government; managerial and work efficiency; appropriateness of technical assistance provided at the country level; technical backstopping from HQ; operational support from HQ; implementation difficulties; adequacy of monitoring and reporting; the extent of national support and commitment and the quality and quantity of administrative and technical support by FAO.
- e) Stakeholder participation in the design, management and implementation of the project, and the level of local ownership. Assessment of the programme management structure and coordination arrangements in North and South (North and South Steering Committees, Technical Committee (only existing in the South), Programme Support Units, etc.), and the extent to which timely and appropriate decisions have been made to support effective implementation and problem resolution.

#### **4.4 Effectiveness**

- f)** Project effectiveness and results, including a full and systematic assessment of all expected outcomes under the project (quantity and quality towards achieving the immediate objectives). The main focus at the end of the project is to evaluate to what extent individual, organizational and institutional capacity has been developed both to collect/analyze and appropriately use food and nutrition information for decision-making.
- g)** Quality of information management and reporting, and the extent to which key stakeholders were kept adequately informed of project activities.
- h)** Coverage of the information that was generated and disseminated (sectoral coverage, geographic coverage of the most vulnerable groups, etc) and systems in place.

#### **4.5 Connectedness/Sustainability**

- i)** The prospects for sustaining the programme's results by the host institutions in GNU and GoSS at the termination of the project. The mission should examine financial viability/recurrent cost financing, equipment/asset maintenance, institutional capacity building and local ownership, etc of the main sub-programmes components, in particular (to be specified):
  - the institutional set up for Food Security
  - the information systems
- j)** "Value added to European Community development objectives and programmes" will be evaluated with respect to the extent to which EU funding for the SIFSIA project complements funding and support provided by the EU for other programmes in Sudan. In particular, linkages between the SIFSIA and EU funded SPCR project and synergies with the global EC/FAO Food Security Information for Action Programme, as well as synergies with the global partnership in general between the EU and FAO, will be examined.
- k)** Analysis of how gender issues were mainstreamed, including strategic and practical gender needs, in the objectives, design, identification of final beneficiaries and implementation of the entity being evaluated. This will include an analysis of gender equity in the management and staffing of the entity.
- l)** The evaluation should consider what, if any, of the normative products<sup>47</sup> introduced during the course of the project have been appropriated that may have enduring benefit after project activities cease.

#### **4.6 Impact**

Analysis of the results of the project in north and south Sudan, especially with regard to: (i) the extent food security information produced by FAO (directly and in collaboration with partners) has informed/been used for decision-making and other purposes; and (ii) the extent to which such uses have the potential to contribute to reducing hunger and eliminating poverty in Sudan.

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<sup>47</sup> Guidelines, tools, standards, methodologies, publications, etc.

## 4.7 Lessons Learned

- m) Analysis of lessons learned in the design and implementation of projects that have aimed to improve food security information systems in Sudan, in the use at national and sub-national levels of the food security information and analysis and how these in turn contribute to improved decision-making.
- n) In the context of the new food security policy directions<sup>48</sup> in North and South Sudan, what lessons learned can be drawn upon to increase impact, effectiveness and sustainability of food security information systems.

## 5. Evaluation design/Methodology

5.1. FAO Independent Office of Evaluation will manage this evaluation in full transparency, while ensuring that it remains completely independent and external to the project management. The FAO Representative and the EU Delegation will take responsibility for liaising with the NAO, Project Steering Committees and relevant stakeholders for all aspects related to information about the evaluation. The evaluation team, once in country, will be facilitated by FAO for administrative issues but will conduct its work independently.

5.2 The evaluation methodology will be consultative and will draw upon the views and perspectives of Government(s), FAO and EC staff at country level, data and documentation reviews, and interviews with key decision maker and partner stakeholders working in the area of food security. Triangulation of evidence and information gathered will underpin the validation of evidence collected and its analysis and will support conclusions and recommendations. Particular attention will be devoted to ensure that women and other under-privileged groups will be consulted in adequate manner. The evaluation will adhere to the UNEG Norms & Standards.

5.3 While ultimate beneficiaries of the programme are households vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition, for the purposes of this evaluation, the primary beneficiaries are considered to be decision makers dealing with food security policy and programming in both GNU and GoSS. Other beneficiaries are the international community (donors, UN, NGOs), private sector and local organizations dealing with food security issues either in emergency or in longer term development contexts.

5.4 The achievement of the tasks described above, will require the use of the following evaluation methods and tools: (i) Desk Review: Review of literature of project related materials as well as contextual information (an analysis of food security situation and trends over the past decade should be undertaken) ; (ii) preparation of an evaluation matrix with related evaluation questions and benchmarks; (iii) Stakeholder Review; (iv) Semi-structured interviews at field level in North and South Sudan; and (v) End-of-mission workshops in the field (Khartoum and Juba) to discuss and validate findings, and explore possible recommendations. The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework<sup>49</sup> as the reference for assessing contributions to poverty alleviation, gender mainstreaming, social, economic and environmental sustainability and the Strengths,

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<sup>48</sup> At present, the EU is considering to extend the support to SIFSIA related areas of work (capacity development for food security information systems and decision making) with a new intervention focusing at the State level.

<sup>49</sup> The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework identifies five different capitals (human, social, natural, financial, and physical), each including different assets. It helps in improving understanding of livelihoods, in particular of the poor. For more information, among others: [http://www.livelihoods.org/info/guidance\\_sheets\\_pdfs/section2.pdf](http://www.livelihoods.org/info/guidance_sheets_pdfs/section2.pdf)

Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) framework for assessment of project/programme results may also be used as an analytical tool.



## 5.2. Phases and Deliverables

July-Sept 2011	Finalization of the TOR in consultation with the EU and PSCs.  Briefing Team Leader by LTU, PTF and OED in FAO (Rome)  Preparation of evaluation matrix and tools
6-27 November 2011	Briefing team in Khartoum and Juba  Field mission  Presentation of initial findings, conclusions and recommendations in Juba and Khartoum
December 2011  January 2012  February 2012	Draft report prepared and circulated for review to FAO and PSC N/S members.  Feedback provided to Team Leader, report finalized.  Management response (by FAO, EU and PSC) to recommendations. Report and MR in the public domain.

## 6. Composition of the Mission

6.1 Under the responsibility of the Independent Office of Evaluation of FAO, the evaluation team will be composed of a Team Leader and 4 other team members .

The Team Leader will be an independent *professional evaluator* with experience in leading large complex evaluations and a solid understanding of FSIS work. He/she will have a postgraduate qualification in a discipline relevant to the assignment, with a minimum of 15 years work experience. Experience in the evaluation of technical assistance programmes, preferably EC-funded, is particularly relevant, as well as proven capacity in working with institutions at different levels. The Team Leader will have overall responsibility for leading the team, preparing the evaluation matrix, coordinating the team members' inputs, writing the report for the north Sudan component and preparing a synthesis of the two (N/S) evaluation reports comparing and contrasting results and drawing common conclusions and recommendations. Excellent report writing skills are a requirement.

S/he will be seconded by a national consultant with expertise in the area of capacity building and institutional development in northern Sudan.

A third consultant will be recruited to be the senior evaluator to lead the team in South Sudan. The consultant will have expertise in FSIS tools and methods and will be seconded by a national consultant with expertise in the area of capacity building and institutional

development in southern Sudan. The senior evaluator will be responsible for the delivery of a complete evaluation report for the South Sudan component of SIFSIA.

A fifth consultant will be recruited with expertise in statistics, data management, remote sensing and other technologies relevant to the SIFSIA project. He will divide his time equally during the mission between north and south Sudan.

6.2 The evaluation team overall is also required to have the following qualifications and expertise:

- Familiarity with the on-going political processes and developments in both North and South Sudan.
- Familiarity with the political, socio-economic and institutional conditions in the Sudan in general.
- Sensitivity to socio-cultural and gender issues.
- Proven practical experience in programme evaluation, including proven expertise in facilitating different types of consultative, evaluative workshops for comparable organizations, including more complex exercises/workshops involving a range of organizations and participants.
- Ability to analyse and synthesise information, and to write clear reports.
- Fluency in English is required. Arabic would be a distinct advantage.

Two sub-teams, each comprised of one FSIS expert and one capacity building and institutional strengthening expert, will be deployed to north and south Sudan respectively. Each sub-team will be required to submit a full report covering the criteria and key questions outlined above. The two evaluation team leaders, assisted by the respective team members, will lead the presentation of each of the reports to the two different Project Steering Committees in Khartoum and Juba, presenting preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations. Each of the Steering Committees will also receive a brief presentation of the findings of the other sub-programme evaluation report.

More specifically, team members will be responsible for:

- a. Ensuring that s/he is fully briefed on the evaluation and has read all key related documentation.
- b. Participating in the Sudan mission, collecting and analysing information, identifying findings and drawing conclusions.
- c. Contributing in a timely manner to the preparation of the respective final evaluation report together with the other core team members and the development of recommendations, in a format and maximum length established by the evaluation management.

6.3 As members of the United Nations Evaluation Group, FAO is committed to the norms and standards of 2005 as well as to the ethical guidelines for evaluation published in 2007. It is therefore expected that evaluators employed by FAO apply and/or ensure high professional standards in line with UN Evaluation Norms & Standards and Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System. All team members will be asked to sign a Declaration of Interest, aimed at ensuring that evaluation consultants do not have a conflict of interest with regard to the programmes that they are evaluating.

6.4 The mission will maintain close liaison with the Representatives of the EC, FAO and concerned Government counterparts, as well as with national and international project staff. Although the mission should feel free to discuss with the authorities concerned anything relevant to its assignment, it is not authorized to make any commitments on behalf of the Government, the donor, or FAO.

6.5. It is understood that Sudan is considered a hardship country and that travel under difficult conditions will occur and specific security precautions are in place.

6.6. The Evaluation Manager from FAO's Independent Evaluation Service will oversee the management of the evaluation process to ensure that the evaluation proceeds smoothly and adheres to acceptable evaluation norms and standards.

## **7. Reporting**

7.1 The mission is fully responsible for its independent reporting which may not necessarily reflect the views of the Government, the donor or FAO. The reports will be written in conformity with the headings and length indicated in Annex 3.

7.2 The evaluation team, lead by the team leader will prepare two **draft evaluation reports**, one for each of the sub-programmes, in accordance with formats to be provided by the FAO Office of Evaluation (OE). In addition, the Team Leader will prepare a brief 2-3 page consolidated synthesis highlighting the main findings of each report. The draft report will be completed, to the extent possible, in the country and the findings and recommendations fully discussed with all concerned parties during a presentation prior to the departure of the mission.

7.3 Each draft report will be presented by the Team leader to the respective Steering Committee in two workshops, to be organised in Juba and Khartoum prior to the departure of the team from Sudan. Members of the Steering Committees should receive the draft findings, conclusions and recommendations before the workshop, so that they can provide informed comments at the workshop. An aide memoir of the feedback session will be prepared.

7.4 The Team Leader will incorporate comments received from stakeholders as appropriate and prepare an independent **Final Evaluation Report**, which will include the brief synthesis as well as the two separate reports for each sub-programme, including conclusions and recommendations for the future of food security information work in North and South Sudan, acknowledging the division into two separate States. The final report will be submitted to the OE within one month of the completion of the mission. OE is responsible for evaluation quality assurance and will clear the report within a maximum period of 14 days, after ensuring that it adequately adheres to the terms of reference, is complete and conforms to UN evaluation standards. OE will be then responsible to formally disseminate the report to FAO, the EU and NAO and to the members of both (North and South) SIFSIA Steering Committees on behalf of the Evaluation Team.

8.4 After the report has been finalised, to improve the utilization of the evaluation report, a management response will be required from FAO, the EU or the PSC on the findings and

recommendations as relevant stating those it accepts and those it rejects and why, and a proposed operational plan on how it intends to follow-up in its future programme developments. This management response should be sent to OE within one month of the finalization of the report. Both the final evaluation report and the management response are considered public documents.

## Annex 2 Evaluation Matrix for SIFSIA Final Evaluation

<b>Question and sub-questions</b>	<b>Potential sources</b>	<b>Question relevant to:</b>
<b>Relevance</b>		(see list of categories below. NB this is indicative are many questions are relevant to all categories of interviewees)
1. How relevant is the SIFSIA programme: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>to the needs and development priorities of the governments of Sudan and ROSS</li> <li>in view of the changing context and secession of South Sudan</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Background documents on the context, and especially analyses of the changing context and issues arising with secession</li> <li>Government documents/ strategies/ plans that indicate government priorities</li> <li>Interviews with high level government officers, aid policy-makers etc</li> <li>Feedback from Project Steering Committees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All, especially 2, 5 and 6 (government ministers and senior civil servants)</li> </ul>
2. How clear and realistic were the objectives of SIFSIA and its design, including: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>how clear and realistic were the targets?</li> <li>how clear and realistic was identification of institutional beneficiaries?</li> <li>assumptions &amp; risks including about the adequacy of resources</li> <li>how clear and realistic were the prospects for sustainability?</li> <li>how were the findings and recommendations of the mid-term evaluation taken on board?</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key project documents eg formulation &amp; inception documents, annual reports</li> <li>Mid-term evaluation and management response</li> <li>Interviews with all key stakeholders ie SIFSIA staff, FAO, EC, government)</li> <li>Interviews with others running food security information systems and capacity-building programmes with govt</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All, especially 1, 2, 5, 8 and 9, and EC</li> </ul>
NB This will build on the analysis from the mid-term evaluation		
3. How clear and realistic has the implementation of the SIFSIA sub-programmes been in terms of: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>the appropriateness of the managerial and institutional framework for implementation</li> <li>external institutional relationships</li> <li>the adequacy and appropriateness of the technical solutions proposed with respect to existing capacities, and the appropriateness of the technical assistance</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Review of planning documents (project formulation document, inception report, log-frame)</li> <li>Mid-term evaluation</li> <li>Interviews with key informants in key ministries and selected international agencies</li> <li>Interviews with PSU staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>All especially 1, 2, 3,4, 9</li> </ul>

provided	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interviews with government staff who participated in SIFSIA capacity-building</li> <li>• Evidence of capacity assessments</li> <li>• Assessment of technical inputs against capacity assessments</li> </ul>	
<b>Efficiency and effectiveness</b>		
4. How clear and logically consistent are the links between inputs, activities, outputs and the final achievement of objectives? To what extent did these change after the mid-term evaluation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Log-frame</li> <li>• Annual reports</li> <li>• Mid-term evaluation</li> <li>• Management response to mid-term evaluation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mainly 1</li> </ul>
5. How cost-effective and timely has implementation been, with a specific focus on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) the efficient use of resources (technical – in the project team, and from FAO HQ; financial; equipment etc)</li> <li>b) the timeliness of inputs</li> <li>c) the timeliness of decision-making</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Brief analysis of SIFSIA project expenditure</li> <li>• Timelines of project implementation</li> <li>• Annual reports</li> <li>• 'Back to office reports'</li> <li>• Interviews with PSU staff and with Project Steering Committees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mainly 1, 2 and 9</li> </ul>
6. How effective has the programme been in delivering its outcomes, particularly in terms of how individual, organizational and institutional capacity has been developed both to collect/analyze and appropriately use food and nutrition information for decision-making. Where this has not been achieved, what have been the reasons?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project documents and progress reports</li> <li>• Interviews with key stakeholders, including PSU staff (possibly in a workshop format)</li> <li>• Interviews with government officers who benefitted from SIFSIA capacity-building: national and state levels</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mainly 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6</li> </ul>
7. What is the quality of information management and reporting, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) quality of information collection</li> <li>b) quality of information analysis</li> <li>c) quality of presentation and dissemination</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evaluation of information management systems and outputs</li> <li>• Review of distribution lists</li> <li>• Interviews with actual and potential users (national level, state level, international agencies)</li> <li>• Interviews with others running food security information systems in Sudan and in ROSS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mainly 1, 2, 8</li> </ul>
8. To what extent have gender issues been mainstreamed, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) gender analysis of food insecurity</li> <li>b) attention to gender and gender equity in SIFSIA's activities, including its capacity-building activities</li> <li>c) the gender balance in the management and staffing of</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review of gender sensitivity in technical inputs and in SIFSIA outputs</li> <li>• Review of gender sensitivity of training materials, where possible</li> <li>• Assessment of gender balance amongst</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mainly 1, 3 and 4</li> </ul>

SIFSIA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>government beneficiaries of SIFSIA (national and state levels)</li> <li>Review of PSU staffing structures</li> </ul>	
9. How efficient and effective have the management arrangements been for SIFSIA, particularly: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>within the PSU</li> <li>within FAO</li> <li>within government, through the Project Steering Committees</li> <li>between FAO and the PSCs</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviews with key stakeholders: PSU, Project Steering Committees members, FAO HQ, EC)</li> <li>Project documents</li> <li>Evidence of how decisions have been taken/ blocked, and speed of execution</li> <li>Review of reporting requirements and quality of reporting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mainly 1, 2, 9 and EC</li> </ul>
<b>Coverage</b>		
10. How appropriate is the coverage of SIFSIA, in terms of: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>national versus state level</li> <li>geographically</li> <li>sectorally</li> <li>in terms of vulnerable groups, covering access to food as well as food production</li> <li>chronic versus acute food insecurity (long-term vs humanitarian)</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project documents</li> <li>Mid-term evaluation</li> <li>Interviews with PSU</li> <li>Interviews with others tracking food insecurity and working with different food insecure groups and in different geographic areas eg NGOs etc</li> <li>Interviews with actual and potential users – government and international agencies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mainly 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8 and EC</li> </ul>
<b>Connectedness/ Sustainability</b>		
11. What is the depth of local ownership of SIFSIA and to what extent has this been fostered by stakeholder participation in management and implementation of the project?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Discussions with Project Steering Committees, and follow-up interviews with individual members</li> <li>Discussions with government ministers and with senior civil servants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mainly 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6</li> </ul>
12. What are the prospects for the sustainability of SIFSIA's work when the project ends, particularly in terms of: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>financial sustainability</li> <li>human resources</li> <li>maintaining equipment and assets</li> <li>institutional sustainability (including the institutional set-up)</li> <li>sustaining the information systems</li> </ol>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of the respective government's financial contribution so far, and evidence of financial provision in future budgets</li> <li>Interviews with PSU</li> <li>Interviews with government officers – state and national level, especially in Ministry of Finance</li> <li>Interviews with others engaged in capacity-</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mainly 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6</li> </ul>

	building with government	
13. Which of the normative products introduced by SIFSIA may have enduring benefit when the project ends and why? Which are less likely to, and why?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interviews with Ministers, senior civil servants and technical officers within government</li> <li>References made to SIFSIA products in interviews</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mainly 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8</li> </ul>
14. What are the complementarities and synergies between SIFSIA and other related projects, especially: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) SPCRP (implemented by FAO and funded by EC)</li> <li>b) EC/ FAO's 'Food Security Information for Action Programme'</li> <li>c) other food security information systems and initiatives operating in Sudan and in South Sudan</li> <li>d) in terms of the global partnership between the EU and FAO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project documents on SPCRP, FSIA , EU/ FAO global partnership</li> <li>Interviews with staff of SPCRP, FSIA</li> <li>Interviews with staff and funders of other food security projects and initiatives</li> <li>Interviews with EC and FAO HQ staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mainly 1, 8, 9, EC. SPCRP staff</li> </ul>
<b>Impact/ outcomes</b>		
15. What has been the impact/ outcomes of the project in terms of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) the extent to which the food security information produced by the project has informed/ been used for decision-making and other purposes, and its relevance to actual and potential users?</li> <li>b) the extent to which such uses have the potential to contribute to reducing hunger and eliminating poverty in Sudan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analysis of documents in which SIFSIA information is referenced</li> <li>Interviews with current and potential users of food security information – national and state levels, international community</li> <li>Policy and other analytical/ evaluative documents on food security and on food security indicators</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mainly 1, 2, 5, 6, 7</li> </ul>

#### **NOTE:**

In answering these questions, reference will be made to the recommendations of the mid-term evaluation (MTE), their relevance, and the extent to which they were acted upon

#### **Main categories of interviewees**

- 1) SIFSIA project staff
- 2) Steering Committee collectively and individual members
- 3) National level government officers who have benefited from capacity-building activities of SIFSIA
- 4) State level government officers who have benefitted from capacity-building activities of SIFSIA
- 5) Potential & actual users of food security information generated by SIFSIA and with SIFSIA support – national level
- 6) Potential & actual users of food security information generated by SIFSIA and with SIFSIA support – state level
- 7) Potential & actual users of food security information generated by SIFSIA and with SIFSIA support – international agencies



- 8) Other information systems (eg VAM, FEWSNet, NGOs etc)
- 9) FAO HQ staff involved with SIFSIA

7<sup>th</sup> November 2011



### Annex 3 List of Persons Interviewed During the Final Evaluation

	Name	Organization	Position	Address
Government of Republic of South Sudan				
1	Hon. Betty Achan Ogwaro	MAF (ROSS)	Minister	<a href="mailto:b_ogwaro@yahoo.co.uk">b_ogwaro@yahoo.co.uk</a>
2	Jaden Tongun Emilio	MAF (ROSS)	Undersecretary Forestry	<a href="mailto:jtemil@yahoo.com">jtemil@yahoo.com</a>
3	Dr. Mathew G Udo	MAF (ROSS)	Undersecretary Agriculture	
4	Prof. George Leju	MAF (ROSS)	DG for Research	
5	Mrs. Margret Daggo Nathaniel	MAF (ROSS)	Senior Inspector/ Post-harvest	0955417766
6	Elijah Luak	MAF (ROSS)	Food Security Database	<a href="mailto:elijahdeng23@gmail.com">elijahdeng23@gmail.com</a>
7	Dr. Makuei Malual Kaang	MARF (ROSS)	Undersecretary	<a href="mailto:makweim@yahoo.com">makweim@yahoo.com</a>
8	Dr. John Ogoto Kanisio	MARF (ROSS)	DG for Planning	
9	James Guma Mark	MARF (ROSS)	DG for Planning	<a href="mailto:gumark2002@yahoo.com">gumark2002@yahoo.com</a>
10	Ms. Victoria Jaba Eluzai	MOH (ROSS)	Director of Nutrition	<a href="mailto:ohakim73@yahoo.com">ohakim73@yahoo.com</a>
11	Philip Dau Thiong	NBS (ROSS)	Director for M&E (NBS)	<a href="mailto:dabekdit@yahoo.com">dabekdit@yahoo.com</a>
12	Regina Ossa Lullo	MGCSW (ROSS)	DG for Gender, Child & Social Welfare	<a href="mailto:ossolullo@yahoo.com">ossolullo@yahoo.com</a>
13	Issac Liabwel C Yol	MWRI (ROSS)	Undersecretary	<a href="mailto:Isaac.liabwel@gamil.com">Isaac.liabwel@gamil.com</a>
14	Robert Peter Zakayo	MWRI (ROSS)	SS ICH Hydrologist	<a href="mailto:rzakayo@yahoo.com">rzakayo@yahoo.com</a>
15	Joejoe Wani	MWRI (ROSS)	Department of Irrigation	
16	Yath Akan Yath	MWRI (ROSS)	Director for Research	<a href="mailto:yath.yath@undp.org">yath.yath@undp.org</a>
17	Paul Dhel Gum	SSRRC	Director of Relief	<a href="mailto:pauldhel16@yahoo.com">pauldhel16@yahoo.com</a>
18	Mojwok Ogawi Mado	MT (ROSS)	SSMA (ROSS)	0914005487
19	Paulino Omne Omay	MT (ROSS)	SSMA (ROSS)	0918211670
20	Emanuel Gurino Nijak	MT (ROSS)	SSMA (ROSS)	9011352954
21	Hashim Ahmed Salim	MT (ROSS)	SSMA (ROSS)	0909126072
22	Manase Yanga Laki	NBS (FSTS)	FSTS Coordinator (a.i)	<a href="mailto:manaseyangalaki@yahoo.com">manaseyangalaki@yahoo.com</a>
23	Emmanuel Dajo	NBS (FSTS)	Database Administrator	<a href="mailto:emmanueldajo@yahoo.com">emmanueldajo@yahoo.com</a>
24	Alex Tangwa	NBS (FSTS)	GIS administrator	0955070342
25	Chan Chuol Lam	NBS (FSTS)	Food security advisor	<a href="mailto:chuollamchan@gmail.com">chuollamchan@gmail.com</a>
26	Poni Rose Lou	NBS (FSTS)	Structural food security officer	<a href="mailto:ponirosy@yahoo.com">ponirosy@yahoo.com</a>
27	Susan Lupai	NBS (FSTS)	Nutrition focal person	<a href="mailto:kejilupai@yahoo.com">kejilupai@yahoo.com</a>
28	Vuni Georfrey A	NBS (FSTS)	Transitory food security officer	<a href="mailto:vunigeofrey@yahoo.com">vunigeofrey@yahoo.com</a>
States				
29	Manasseh Manyen Mabek	SMARF (Lakes)	Food Security Coordinator	0955123358
30	Mabor Kau Lam	SMAF (Lakes)	Director for Administration	<a href="mailto:maborkau@yahoo.com">maborkau@yahoo.com</a>
31	Paul M Degal	SMARF (Lakes)	Director General	090620302. 0955957333
32	James Mapour	SMAF (Lakes)	Dir of Planning; Focal person	<a href="mailto:j.mapour@yahoo.com">j.mapour@yahoo.com</a>
33	Vijo George	SMAF (Lakes)	CLiMIS	<a href="mailto:sudanwarfchild@yahoo.com">sudanwarfchild@yahoo.com</a>
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#### **Annex 4 Schedule of the SIFSIA-S Final Evaluation Team**

12 October 2011

SIFSIA-S team leader in Rome for briefing with OED, TCE, ESA, ESS and NRL

6 November 2011

Joint team meeting in Addis Ababa of SIFSIA-S and SIFSIA-N evaluation teams

7 November 2011

PSU Briefing of SIFSIA-S evaluation team in Juba

8 to 11 November 2011

Interviews with principal SIFSIA-S stakeholders in Juba  
(including EU, FSTS, MARF, MoH, NBS, FSTS, SMA and SSRRC)

12 to 15 November 2011

Field visit to MAF/MARF Lakes State (Rumbek)

15 to 17 November 2011

Interviews with principal SIFSIA-S stakeholders in Juba  
(including MAF, CIDA, World Bank, SPCRP, WFP, FEWSNET, Oxfam and MAF Central Equatoria)

17 to 19 November 2011

Field Visit to MAF/MARF Upper Nile State (Malakal)

21 to 23 November 2011

Interviews with principal SIFSIA-S stakeholders in Juba  
(including MWRI, UNRC, UNOCHA, FAO, UNICEF, DFID, USAID and NGO Forum)

24 November 2011

am Debriefing to PSU

pm Debriefing to principal SIFSIA-S stakeholders

25 November 2011

am videoconference with SIFSIA-N evaluation team and EU Delegation Khartoum

26 November 2011

Joint team meeting in Addis Ababa of SIFSIA-S and SIFSIA-N evaluation teams

## **Annex 5 FSTS: List of Information Products Generated through SIFSIA-S support**

### **South(ern) Sudan Food Security Updates**

Federal/National level<sup>50</sup>

October to November 2009

March to April 2010

May to June 2010

July to September 2010

October to December 2010

January to February 2011

March to April 2011

May to June 2011

July to August 2011

October to December 2011

### **South(ern) Sudan Nutrition Updates**

Federal/National level

November 2010 (not on CLiMIS website)

June 2011 (not on CLiMIS website)

### **Agro-meteorological Bulletins**

Federal/ National level

Produced on a monthly or bimonthly basis from March to September 2009

Produced on a monthly or bi-monthly basis from May to November 2010

Produced on a monthly or bi-monthly basis from March to November 2011

### **IPC Maps**

Produced in October 2009, January 2010, May 2010, October 2010, March 2011

### **Special Market Reports**

- Special Market Analysis Report on the impact of border blockade & fuel price rises on food security (June 2011)
- Special Market Report on prices of major food and non-food commodities (October 2011)

### **Policy Briefs**

- Food Security Policy in Southern Sudan: challenges and the way forward (October 2010)
- The food and livelihood security implication of influx of returnees to South Sudan: current challenge and the way forward (June 2011)

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<sup>50</sup> Food Security & Livelihoods Bulletins were however produced by Eastern Equatoria State since January 2008

## Annex 6 Common Information, Communication & Training Issues and Lessons Learned

Issue	Implications	Examples from SIFSIA
Hardware	Long delays in installation of hardware	GIEWS (O3),
	Reliance on outside maintenance	AWS – faults take long time to resolve
Software	Expensive and not widely available for distribution down to state levels	ArcGIS,
	Delays in installation	CLIMIS
	Incomplete or aborted elements – better clarity and functionality at the programming level	GIEWS Workstation
	Delays in application development	CLIMIS / Nutrition Information System
	Effective IT specification limits progress of development	Nutrition (MoH)
	Licences – update of licences procured by SIFSIA	GIS versions in FSTS
Communications	Internet connectivity	Slow internet connectivity impact on data submission in CLIMIS
	Internet hosting	CLIMIS -
	Communications – network subscriptions	AWS's not sending data for 3 months due to unpaid bills
	Product awareness and distribution	NRM data – only just being disseminated
	Website – as a tool for monitoring	Not envisaged as an indicator
Training + Training installation mismatch	Appropriate level training and awareness raising – ICT literacy.	State level training
	Need for refresher training based on training in advance of installation	Climis,
	Advanced training / ToT <i>ToT comes after extensive training has taken place rather than upfront to allow in country training staff</i>	General issue of training
	Selection of appropriate candidates <i>Training is going to inappropriate trainees and non-technical staff are taking technical training</i>	State level training
Staffing	Turnover / Loss of staff and loss of skill sets as people move on.	All areas of capacity development
	Inability to acquire calibre of staff needed	
Information quality	Standardisation	Lack of standardisation of IPC contributory data
	Validation and calibration: Automatic Weather stations – lack of calibrations	AWS calibration / Land cover data field validation
	Capture quality and quality assurance	Some concerns over the rigour of the procedures for QA of data.
Exit strategy	Maintenance issues: hardware and software / licencing	Handover of licences and
	Training manuals / ToT	CLIMIS good handover procedures well in advance of go live situation with technical training on system and programming (PHP).